The world is changing before our eyes, the right of the strong is already the prerogative of not only the United States and its satellites, as they would write in the good old days. Russia followed the same path and used force in Syria. Beijing's official rhetoric is becoming increasingly harsh as a country that not only has economic ambitions, but also intends to become the third state in the world that is capable of resolving issues by military means. Three critical nodes - Syria, Ukraine and the Korean Peninsula, where the interests of many countries clashed, determine the military-political situation in the world. Against the background of these "hot" spots, Afghanistan, which is in a non-equilibrium state and can explode at any moment, has remained a little away from the main information flow.

North becomes more accessible

Global warming probably still exists. The climate in the Arctic has become warmer. This fact and the development of new technologies for the extraction of natural resources have significantly increased the interest in the region in many countries of the world. And not only countries located in the Arctic zone. China, Korea, India, Singapore want to join the development and production of hydrocarbons in the northern latitudes. Regional players - Russia, the USA, Canada, Norway, Denmark - are building up their military presence in polar regions their countries. Russia is restoring military bases on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago.

NATO countries are monitoring the air situation in the region and are also building up their intelligence and military capabilities. For the deployment of reinforcement forces in Norway, weapons depots and military equipment. The head of this country made a proposal at the NATO summit in Poland to develop a new alliance strategy that would allow the permanent presence of the combined naval forces in the northern latitudes. It was also proposed to involve the armed forces of the non-regional countries of the alliance and neutral countries - Sweden and Finland - in joint exercises more widely. Both Russia and NATO countries conduct air patrols in the Arctic regions and strategic aviation flights. Political peace in the Arctic exists against the backdrop of increased armed presence.

To the west no change

Probably, few people in Russia and NATO countries, except for frank hawks, believe in an open military clash. But the situation in the world shows that the policy of strategic containment and weakening of the economic potential pursued in relation to Russia is undoubtedly a clear security threat. The military infrastructure of the alliance is being built along the entire western Russian border. Four are being deployed in the Baltic countries and coordinating centers are being created for receiving and deploying additional forces, the same centers have been created in Bulgaria, Poland and Romania. This year, interceptor missiles will be deployed at the bases missile defense in Poland and Romania, about which it has long been said that they are not directed against Russia. NATO officials announced that by doing so they covered the southern direction from a ballistic missile attack.

The administration of US President Donald Trump intends to force the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance to spend the prescribed 3% of the country's budget on defense. Which in the foreseeable future will significantly increase the number of weapons concentrated near the borders of Russia. But still, economic restrictions formally tied to certain events pose a great danger.

Ukraine is also the West

A significant threat to Russia's national security is the conflict in the eastern regions of Ukraine. The hope for peace after the conclusion of the Minsk agreements, which determined the roadmap for the cessation of hostilities and the reintegration of certain regions of the Lugansk and Donbass regions, has not been realized. The region remains highly likely to resume hostilities. Mutual shelling of the armed forces of Ukraine and the self-proclaimed republics continues. The initiative to introduce peacekeeping forces, proposed by both Russia and Ukraine, did not materialize due to different understandings of the question of where to deploy them and who will be included in these forces. This conflict will for a long time influence the military-political situation in the world as one of the points of struggle against US global dominance. The situation in the east of Ukraine is largely a reflection of the situation in the world, where there is an increase in confrontation between global players. For Russia, this is a very unpleasant conflict, not only because of the proximity to the borders, but also because it can always serve as an informational occasion for the introduction of new sanctions.

South direction

Since the withdrawal Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the threat to national security from this direction has only increased. Despite the fact that Russia does not have a direct border with this country, the possible penetration of terrorists and allied obligations oblige to closely monitor the situation in the region. Reviews around the world note that in last years an increase in the number of terrorist and religious extremist gangs has been noticed. And this cannot but cause concern. The answer to the question of what is happening in the world today is impossible without studying the situation in Afghanistan.

Almost a third of the militants come from the former Central Asian republics, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which has already participated in the preparation of terrorist acts in Russia, the Islamic Jihad Union and others. Unlike the largest armed force of the Taliban, which aims to create an Afghan caliphate, these organizations want to create an Islamic state in the Central Asian republics. In the southwest, the main factor destabilizing the military-political situation in the world, since the interests of many states also clash here, is an increase in the number of countries where an armed struggle against international terrorism is being waged - these are Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya. The situation in the zone where Armenia and Azerbaijan oppose each other is periodically aggravated. Georgia aspires to NATO and the European Union and wants to restore its territorial integrity. On the positive side, the party "Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia" that came to power announced that the only way to reunite with Abkhazia and South Ossetia was possible peacefully.

Syrian crossroads

The once prosperous Middle Eastern country, almost completely destroyed, is suffering from one of the longest military conflicts of the 21st century. Starting as a civil war, this war quickly developed into a fight of all against all, in which dozens of countries participate. The clash of numerous interests affects not only the situation in the region, but also the entire modern military-political situation in the world.

The government forces of the Syrian Republic, with the support of the Iranian forces and the Russian military space forces, are fighting the terrorist organization ISIS and armed opposition groups, which, to one degree or another, cooperate with various extremist groups. In the north of the country, Turkey has introduced its military grouping, which is fighting the Kurds. The United States and its allies oppose Russia, Iran and Syria, supporting the opposition and periodically launching missile attacks on Syrian government forces, accusing Damascus of using chemical weapons. Israel is also launching missile strikes on targets in Syria, citing its national interests.

Will the world

In the world, the military-political situation is already being compared with the situation during the Caribbean crisis. So far, a direct military clash between Russian and American troops has been avoided. The Syrian government, with the assistance of the Russian center for the reconciliation of the warring parties, managed to establish a ceasefire with many armed opposition groups. The fighting is mainly against ISIS units, Turkish troops, with the support of the Syrian opposition in the north, are also pushing the militants. Kurdish detachments, supported by the aviation of the Western coalition led by the United States, are advancing on the city of Raku. The territory controlled by ISIS has shrunk significantly.

On February 15-16, Astana (Kazakhstan) hosted another round of negotiations to establish peace in Syria. With the mediation of Russia, Iran, Turkey, Jordan, the participation of the UN and the United States, representatives of the Syrian government and ten opposition groups discussed issues of maintaining a truce, exchanging prisoners and monitoring the current situation. The parties are still far from starting direct negotiations, but the first step towards peace has been taken. Inter-Syrian negotiations with the opposition are also taking place in Geneva, where the main obstacle was the demand for the immediate departure of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. But at the last meeting, the United States tentatively agreed that Assad should stay until the new elections. There is no breakthrough, but there is hope. Another platform for peace talks is the National Dialogue Congress taking place in Sochi, co-organized by Russia, Turkey and Iran, the main guarantors of a ceasefire in Syria.

East is a delicate matter

The main factor influencing the development of the military-political situation in the world is the strengthening of China as a regional and global player. China is modernizing its armed forces. The United States seeks to maintain its leadership in the region by strengthening military ties with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. Including using the contentious issues of China with Vietnam and the Philippines on the islands in the South China Sea and trying to act as an international arbitrator. Under the pretext of protecting against the North Korean nuclear threat, last year the United States began building a THAD missile defense base in South Korea, which was seen by China as a threat to its national security. China imposed sanctions on South Korea, forcing it to promise not to deploy any further missile defense systems. Japan is building up the power of its armed forces, is striving to increase the role of the army in solving political issues, and has gained the opportunity to use military force abroad.

Korean way

The most important driver of news for almost the entire 2017 was the squabble between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. An advanced Twitter user called Kim a rocket man, in response he was also showered with unseemly nicknames, and this continued until the New Year. The occasions, of course, were not so cheerful. In February 2017, the DPRK launched the Kwangmenseong rocket with a satellite on board. Given the fourth nuclear test that Pyongyang conducted on January 6, all countries regarded this launch as a test of a ballistic missile. Experts calculated that the range of the missile could reach 13 thousand kilometers, that is, it could theoretically reach the United States. In response, the UN announced the sanctions by unanimous decision of the members of the Security Council, including Russia. During the year, the DPRK made several more launches and announced its ability to equip missiles with nuclear warheads. In response, the UN introduced a new package of sanctions, in addition, the United States introduced its own economic restrictions, regarding these launches as a threat to national security. Donald Trump said: "These are the toughest sanctions ever imposed on a single country." The US President also announced the possibility of a military solution to the Korean problem and sent his aircraft carriers to the Korean Peninsula. Pyongyang responded by announcing the possibility of a retaliatory nuclear strike. The situation in the world has become aggravated, the possibility of various military scenarios is being seriously discussed by experts. All news reviews about what is happening in the world today began with the situation around Pyongyang's nuclear program.

Olympic reconciliation

Everything changed on the Korean peninsula after the North Korean leader's New Year's conciliatory speech, where he spoke about the possibility of participation in the Olympic Games in South Korea and a dialogue about the current situation. The parties held a series of high-level talks. The North Korean team took part in the Olympic Games, the countries exchanged performances of musical groups. This helped to reduce the tension of the military-political situation in the world, everyone understood that there would be no war yet.

The delegation of South Korea, headed by the head of the National Security Administration under President Chung Eun-yong, held a series of negotiations with all interested parties. After negotiations with Kim Jong-un, they personally reported the results to US President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Japanese Prime Minister Shinjiro Abe and top officials of their countries. Based on the results of shuttle diplomacy, an inter-Korean summit and a meeting between the US president and the leader of the DPRK are being prepared. Michael Pompeo, director of the CIA and future secretary of state, visited Pyongyang on April 18 and held talks with Kim Jong-un.

The rest of the world

Latin America and Africa are also making their contribution to the military-political situation in the world. Main problems Latin American countries lie more in the political and economic plane: increased competition and the struggle for Natural resources, low control over some territories. The issues of combating drug trafficking and criminal armed groups, which sometimes control entire regions of the country, are very acute. In the region, the political situation is influenced by disputed territorial issues, which are still being resolved through negotiations. But the countries of the region are also intensively building up the power of their armed forces. In Africa, the main threat to the stability of the military-political situation in the world is still Libya, where an armed conflict continues between supporters and opponents of radical Islamization with the participation of local tribes. In many other parts of Africa, there are extremist groups that are involved in the smuggling of drugs and weapons, illegal migration.

In general, the features of the current military-political situation in the world show a possible increase in the number of regional conflicts and challenges to Russia's national security.

article. Clause 1 of the Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation dated July 23, 2009 No. 64 “On Some Issues of the Practice of Considering Disputes on the Rights of the Owners of Premises to the Common Property of a Building”8 states that since the relations of the owners of premises located in a non-residential building arising from the common property in such a building is not directly regulated by law, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Art. 6 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, the norms of legislation regulating similar relations, in particular Art. 249, 289, 290 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation.

Since 2009, the provisions of the above Plenum have been actively used in judicial practice and in terms of recognizing the owners of premises located in a non-residential building, the right of common shared ownership of its common property9.

As a result of our excursion of development legal regulation in relation to common property in non-residential premises, we believe that it is necessary to fix the status of common property in non-residential premises at the legislative level and thereby establish gaps in the legislation.

1 Some legal aspects of building management. RELGA - scientific and cultural journal. No. 17. 2011, Internet resource: http://www.relga.ru/EotkopM^ebObjects/tgu-ww.woa/wa/Mam?textid=3030&1eve1 1=mat&^e12=ar11c^

2 Bulletin of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation. 2005. No. 4.

3 Bulletin of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation. 2002. No. 12.

4 See, for example: Decree of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Far Eastern District of December 18, 2002 No. F03-A51/02-2/2512; decrees

Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Urals District No. F09-2398/03-GK of 03.09.2003, No. F09-4495/04-GK of 20.01.2005; Decree of the FAS MO dated August 17, 2005 No. KG-A40 / 7495-05. The documents were not officially published (see ATP).

5 See, for example: Lapach V.A. Non-residential premises as objects of civil rights // Legislation. 2003. No. 4. S. 12.; Ilyin D.I. Real estate legislation: problems of the content of the concepts used // Journal Russian law. 2005. No. 8. P. 150; Khurtsilava A.G. Civil law grounds for acquiring rights to non-residential premises: Abstract of the thesis. Diss... cand. legal Sciences. M., 2006. S. 9-10; Pidzhakov A.Yu., Nechuikina E.V. On the issue of legal regulation of the turnover of non-residential premises // Civil law. 2004. No. 2. S. 47.; Skvortsov A. Distribution of shares in the implementation of the investment and construction project // New Legislation and Legal Practice. 2009. No. 1.

6 Suite Yu.P. Features of ownership of the common property of apartment buildings and non-residential buildings // Laws of Russia: experience, analysis, practice. 2011. No. 6.

7 Chubarov V.V. Problems of legal regulation of real estate: Abstract of the thesis. Diss... doc. legal Sciences. M., 2006. S. 30.

8 Bulletin of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation. 2009. No. 9.

9 See: Determination of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation dated August 19, 2009 No. 10832/09; FAS resolution Northwestern District No. А05-3116/2009 dated October 22, 2009; Resolution of the Thirteenth Arbitration Court of Appeal of St. Petersburg dated September 21, 2009 No. 13AP-7641/2009; Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the North-Western District in the case of November 18, 2009 No. А05-9710/2008; Decree of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Volga District in the case of November 10, 2009 No. A65-3807 / 2009; Decree of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Urals District dated November 09, 2009 No. Ф09-8894 / 09-С5. The documents were not officially published (see ATP).

INTERNATIONAL STATION OF RUSSIA AT THE PRESENT STAGE

DEVELOPMENT

V.N. Fadeev,

Doctor of Law, Professor, Professor of the Department of Criminology, Moscow University of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation Scientific specialty 12.00.08 - Criminal Law and Criminology;

penal law Reviewer: Doctor of Economics, Candidate of Law, Professor Eriashvili N.D.

Email: [email protected] en

Annotation. An analysis of the international position of Russia in present stage historical development. Identified and substantiated trends that negatively affect the socio-political situation, the viability and security of our country in modern conditions and in the future; an assessment of their current state and development prospects is given.

Keywords: death of the Soviet empire; European metropolises; colonial possessions; authoritarian traditions; counterterrorism cooperation.

INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON THE CURRENT STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT

Doctor of Juridical Science, professor of Criminology department

of Moscow University MVD RF

Abstract. The author conducted the analysis of the international position of Russia on the current stage of historic development. The author identified and rationalized the tendencies that have a negative impact on the social-political situation, viability and security of our country in the modern conditions and for the future time, as well as estimated their current condition and prospect of development.

Keywords: collapse of the soviet empire; European metropolises; colonial possessions; authoritative traditions; counter terrorist cooperation.

The United States, which is facing "threats" from Al-Qaeda and Iran, growing instability in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East, the growing power and geopolitical weight of China and India, clearly does not need new enemies. Nevertheless, their relations with Russia will objectively worsen every year. The intensity of mutual rhetoric on both sides is growing, previously signed security agreements are under threat, and Moscow and Washington are increasingly looking at each other through the prism of the Cold War. Radar stations in the Czech Republic and anti-missiles in Poland do nothing to ease tensions. Ignoring the position of the UN Security Council and Russia on the issue of self-proclamation and recognition of Kosovo's independence by the US, Great Britain, Germany and France, other NATO countries and their vassals puts the world on the brink of a new redivision. The world order, laid down after the Second World War, began to crumble before our eyes. The United States continues to equip the world according to its scenario. The West echoes them and unconditionally supports them.

China has always had and will always have a special opinion and a special status. India is still busy with its own problems. Russia remains. Of course, the United States would like to deal with an obedient "Kozyrev" Russia, or at least the one it was under the late Yeltsin - let it "blather", let it "rattling", but they knew that we had almost nothing behind our souls It was.

It's not that the United States didn't expect the oil price boom in recent years - they provoked it themselves - they didn't expect the oil genie to pull Russia out of the debt swamp so quickly. Russia today begins to rise from its knees. And this cannot but irritate the US and the West. It should be noted that our relations with Japan in the last years of Putin's rule somehow faded into the background. This does not indicate the loss of our interest in contacts with Japan. This says more about the weakening of the combined influence of Japan on the world stage.

Undoubtedly, the main reasons for the disappointment of the United States and the West in Russia were the increasing independence in domestic and assertiveness of Moscow in foreign policy. However, the US and the West also bear a considerable share of the responsibility for mutual cooling and the gradual disintegration of bilateral ties. To reverse the situation, Russia has only gas in its hands. But one gas may not be enough.

But the United States is especially annoyed and the West is alarmed by the “disordered” transformation of Russia, according to their scenario, from an expansionist communist empire into a great Power of the traditional type, which sets itself ambitious tasks of modernizing the economy, and hence the army. The United States in relation to Russia will still have to rely on the opinion prevailing in Washington that the Reagan administration won the Cold War in general, alone. And only, they say, the United States is the winner in the Cold War. There were two winners in World War II - the USSR and the USA and allies, and the world became bipolar. Today, according to the same logic, the world should become unipolar. In fact, this is not so, and, undoubtedly, the majority of Russian citizens perceive the collapse of the Soviet state in a completely different way.

The collapse of the USSR is, of course, the greatest defeat of our Fatherland, perhaps in its entire history. A great state has been destroyed - in fact, an empire. But this is the outside. The United States and the West did win the Cold War, but in this case The victory of one side does not mean the defeat of the other. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and their advisers believed that they, along with the United States, also belonged to the number of winners in the Cold War. They gradually came to the conclusion that the communist system was not suitable for the USSR, and especially for Russia. In their opinion, they acted in the best interests of their country, and did not need any external pressure. This psychology is akin to psi-

chology of the Vlasovites or other traitors during the war who served the enemies of the Fatherland in the name of the notorious idea of ​​fighting the Bolsheviks.

But here we must not forget about the deep goals of the destruction of our state - this is the last stronghold of Orthodoxy, a huge territory and huge resources. Even if someday, however, hypothetically, Russia becomes a more democratic country than the United States, the desire to destroy us will still remain. Of course, the realities of the XXI century. more than once will force the United States to reconsider its strategy towards Russia. From a geopolitical point of view, Russia is a bridge between East and West, between North and South. This means that Russia is a bridge between world civilizations.

Regardless of the world order (unipolar or multipolar), the world always strives for the form of communicating vessels for the movement of people and capital. And here you can’t do without the Russian bridge. Control over the bridge is a very important argument for the future policy of the superpowers. And who are they, the superpowers, today and tomorrow? The answer is obvious - USA, Europe (West) and China. If in the XX century. the thesis was relevant - whoever controls Eurasia controls the world, then tomorrow the emphasis may shift to the level of a bridge. And Russia may find itself at the epicenter of superpower interests. And here, in order to dictate the rules on its own bridge and not be under the bridge, Russia will have to be strong and independent both economically and militarily-politically. There is simply no other way. One-sided orientation only to the West or to the East is disastrous for Russia. Remember our coat of arms. Our eagle is not a freak, not a mutant or a victim of Chernobyl. It contains the great meaning of our place and our role in the world.

It is possible that in the coming years the United States will not be up to Russia. Too many internal problems have accumulated, and not all is well in external affairs. Washington's diplomacy toward Russia has always left the impression that making Russia a strategic partner has never been a priority. The administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush believed that if they needed cooperation from Russia, they could provide it without much effort or concessions. The Clinton administration seemed especially inclined to view Russia as an analogue of post-war Germany or Japan, as a country that could be forced to follow the political lead of the United States, and which, in time, even should like it. Washington seems to have forgotten that no American soldiers stood on Russian soil, and its cities were not razed to the ground. atomic bombs. Russia is the legal successor of the USSR, but Russia is not the USSR. Psychologically Russia

practically already got rid of the complex of defeat of the USSR. Russia is another country. Therefore, Russia, in a big way, was not defeated; began to carry out transformations and “clean up” after the collapse of the “parental home”. It is not the same. And this, basically, will determine Russia's reaction to the actions of the United States.

Since the collapse of the USSR and the fall of the Iron Curtain, Russia has been building relations with the United States not as a client state, reliable ally, or true friend, but also not as an adversary, and, moreover, not as an adversary with global ambitions and hostile to us. messianic ideology. However, the risk of Russia moving into the camp of US opponents is quite real. In many approaches to foreign policy issues, the points of view of the United States and Russia are diametrically opposed. And this is a serious reason for a future confrontation. The US does not yet consider Russia strong enough to take our point of view into account. And political confrontation, backed up by real military threats (radar stations in the Czech Republic and anti-missiles in Poland, further expansion of NATO at the expense of Georgia and, possibly, Ukraine), will inevitably lead to a military confrontation, albeit based on the deterrence doctrine. But this is a new round of the arms race.

For the United States and the West, this is a technological separation from Russia and China, for us, these are unsustainable costs, akin to those that Reagan arranged for us with his concept “ star wars". To catch up with the weak strong means hopelessly lagging behind. And this path is ordered to us by the fate of the USSR. To avoid such an outcome, Russia must understand where weak spots from the US and its allies where they are making mistakes, and urgently take adequate measures to stop the downward spiral of the situation.

Russia must understand that in the XXI century. it is not just a bridge, it is a fork, if you like, a crossroads of world civilizations. And whether there will be accidents or other cataclysms at this crossroads largely depends on Russia and you and me. In the meantime, we have sat too long at a low start. Misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the events that led to the end of the Cold War significantly influenced the formation political course USA in relation to Russia. Although Washington's actions were one of the important factors that hastened the collapse of the Soviet empire, it should, more than is usually done, be credited to reformers in Moscow itself.

Let's not forget that at the beginning of the second half of the 1980s, the collapse of the USSR and even the Soviet bloc was by no means inevitable. After Gorbachev became General Secretary in 1985, his goal was to solve problems that had already appeared in the days of Leonid

Brezhnev. And these are: the lack of free military resources, which was especially exposed in Afghanistan and Africa, huge defense spending that placed an unbearable burden on the Soviet economy, the fall in the overall prestige of the USSR, and the accumulated problems in relations with the countries of Eastern Europe within the framework of the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact. The result was to be an increase in the influence and prestige of the USSR.

When Gorbachev drastically cut subsidies to the countries of the Eastern Bloc, he refused to support retrograde ruling regimes in the Warsaw Pact states and initiated "perestroika", the dynamics of political processes in Eastern Europe changed radically, which resulted in the mostly peaceful fall of communist regimes and the weakening of Moscow's influence in the region. Ronald Reagan contributed to this process by increasing pressure on the Kremlin. But it was Gorbachev, and not White House ended the Soviet empire.

American influence played an even smaller role in the collapse of the USSR itself. The administration of George W. Bush supported the independence aspirations of the Baltic republics and signaled to Gorbachev that violent action against the legitimately elected separatist governments in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia would jeopardize Soviet-American relations. However, by allowing pro-independence parties to run and win relatively free elections, and by refusing to take drastic measures to remove them from power with the help of security forces, Gorbachev effectively secured the Baltic states' exit from the USSR. Russia itself dealt the final blow to it, demanding for itself the same institutional status as that of the other union republics. At a meeting of the Politburo, Gorbachev said that if Russia were allowed to gain sovereignty, it would be "the end of the empire." And so it happened. After the unsuccessful attempt at a reactionary putsch in August 1991, Gorbachev could no longer prevent Yeltsin, as well as the leaders of Belarus and Ukraine, from "dismantling" the Soviet Union.

The Reagan and Bush Sr. administrations were aware of all the dangers associated with the collapse of the superpower, and ensured that the collapse of the USSR was "manageable", skillfully combining sympathy with firmness. They treated Gorbachev with respect, but did not make any significant concessions to the detriment of US interests. Thus, they outright rejected Gorbachev's desperate requests for large-scale economic assistance, since the United States had no reason to help him save the Soviet empire. However, when the Bush administration rejected Moscow's requests to refrain from military action against Saddam Hussein after

After he took over Kuwait, the White House tried very hard to show Gorbachev due courtesy, "not to poke his nose" in this fact, as then Secretary of State James Baker put it. As a result, the United States managed to kill two birds with one stone: defeat Saddam and maintain close cooperation with the Soviet Union, mostly on Washington's terms.

If the administration of George W. Bush had provided emergency economic assistance to the democratic government of independent Russia in 1992, then a large-scale “package” of financial assistance could have prevented the collapse of the Russian economy and, in the long run, would have contributed to a closer “tie” of Russia to the West. However, Bush's position was too weak to take bold steps to help Russia. At that time, he was already losing the election battle to Democratic candidate Bill Clinton, who criticized the incumbent president for being too focused on foreign policy and inattention to the economic situation in the United States.

Although domestic political issues were central to his election campaign, once in the White House, Clinton immediately tried to help Russia. His administration organized a significant financial assistance Moscow, mainly through the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Even in 1996, Clinton was ready to speak highly of Yeltsin, so much so that he even compared his decision to use military force against separatists in Chechnya with the actions of Abraham Lincoln during the American Civil War. Yeltsin was practically on the "short leash" of Clinton. Actually, this leash Clinton gave to Bush. In the United States, unlike in Russia, with the change of the owner of the White House, foreign policy does not change much. Americans choose the president for themselves, not for the outside world, and even more so, not for Russia.

The main miscalculation of the Clinton administration in keeping the "short leash" was its decision to continue to exploit Russia's weakness. She sought to achieve maximum advantages for the United States in terms of foreign policy, economy, security in Europe and post-Soviet space until Russia recovers from the shocks of the transition period. The US and the West did not expect that the transitional period in their relationship with Russia would end with Vladimir Putin. Many US politicians thought that Russia would not soon wake up from the “hangover syndrome” of the first president. But Russia "sobered up" much earlier than expected in the US and the West; moreover, everything that had happened to her "the evening before", in the morning she began to recall selectively and with indignation.

Behind the façade of foreign friendship, Clinton administration officials believed that the Kremlin should unconditionally accept the American concept of Russia's national interests. In their view, if Moscow's preferences don't align with Washington's goals, they can be safely ignored. After all, the Russian economy was in ruins, the army was collapsing, and in many ways she herself behaved like a defeated country. Unlike other European metropolises that were leaving their former colonial possessions, Russia did not try to negotiate terms that would protect its economic and security interests in Eastern Europe and the countries of the former USSR. As for domestic policy, Yeltsin's team of radical reformers often only welcomed pressure from the IMF and the United States, justifying the tight and highly unpopular monetary policy that they actually pursued on their own.

Soon, however, even Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, dubbed "Mr. Yes" for his acquiescence to the West, began to irritate the "cruel affair" with the Clinton administration. Once he told Talbott, who held in 1993-1994. Ambassador-at-Large to the Newly Independent States: “It's already not too nice when you guys tell us: we will do such and such, whether you like it or not. So at least don't rub salt in the wounds by saying that it's in our best interest to obey your orders."

But these requests of even Yeltsin's most devoted US reformers were ignored in Washington, where such an arrogant approach was gaining more and more popularity. Talbott and his aides called this approach “feeding Russia spinach”: Uncle Sam paternally regales Russian leaders with political “foods” that Washington considers “healthy for the new Russia,” no matter how unappetizing they may seem to Moscow. Yeltsin's reformers, as in kindergarten, followed the rule: "The more you tell them it's for their own good, the more they choke." By signaling that Russia should not have an independent foreign - or even domestic - policy, the Clinton administration certainly generated strong rejection among sensible politicians in Moscow. Until they were in power, this US neo-colonialist approach, which went hand in hand with the recommendations of the IMF, which, according to most even Western economists today, was absolutely not suitable for Russia and was so painful for the population that it was easy to implement them democratically impossible. However, individual Yeltsin

radical reformers were ready to impose these measures on the people without their consent. At one time, the Communist Party interfered with them, then Yevgeny Primakov.

However, politicians such as former President Nixon, as well as many prominent American businessmen and experts on Russia, recognized the fallacy of Washington's course and called for a compromise between Yeltsin and the conservative parliament. Nixon, for example, was alarmed when Russian officials told him that Washington had expressed a willingness to turn a blind eye to the Yeltsin administration's "drastic" measures against its Supreme Soviet if the Kremlin simultaneously accelerated economic reforms. "Encouraging a departure from the principles of democracy in a country with such an authoritarian tradition as Russia's is like trying to put out a fire with gasoline," Nixon warned. Moreover, he argued, if Washington proceeded from the “fatally erroneous assumption” that Russia was no longer a world power and would not become one for a long time to come, its actions would endanger peace and democracy in the region.

However, Clinton ignored Nixon's advice and continued to turn a blind eye to Yeltsin's most egregious excesses. Relations between President Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet soon reached a stalemate, followed by Yeltsin's unconstitutional decree dissolving it, which eventually led to an outbreak of violence and the shelling of the parliament building with tank guns. After that, Yeltsin "pushed through" a new constitution that gave the head of state the broadest powers to the detriment of the legislature. Actually, according to this Constitution, Russia lives to this day. Then this step made it possible to strengthen the power of the first president of Russia, and the Constitution marked the beginning of a “drift” towards authoritarianism. This, in turn, was the logical result of Washington's frivolous encouragement of Yeltsin's propensity for authoritarianism, enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

Other aspects of the arrogant foreign policy of the Clinton administration only increased the displeasure of sensible politicians in Russia. NATO expansion - especially its first wave to Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic - was not in itself such a big problem. Most Russians were ready to agree that NATO expansion is an unpleasant event, but so far there is almost no threat to their country. But this was the case until the crisis over Kosovo in 1999, when NATO launched a war against Serbia, despite the categorical objections of Moscow and without the sanction of the Security Council.

According to the UN, the Russian elite and people soon came to the conclusion that they were being deliberately misled. NATO is still a military bloc directed against Russia, against the Orthodox peoples.

Of course, the Russian elite, which considers itself the custodian of the traditions of the Great Power - especially those in a state of "decline" - never liked such demonstrations of their insignificance. This played into the hands of those forces that seriously thought about the future of Russia as a sovereign state with thousand years of history. They felt that Russia seriously faced the Hamlet question: "to be or not to be." And this understanding by Putin's team is much more important today than the ideas of nationalization “according to Zyuganov” and Zhirinovsky's foreign policy ambitions combined.

Today, Russia is getting out from under the "umbrella" of the United States and even offers itself an energy umbrella to Europe. This is a welcome trend for us. But it will undoubtedly provoke sharp opposition from the US and NATO. And we will soon feel it. The next cycle of the global economic crisis that began in 2008 will not bypass Russia. If Russia, not caring about its rear (domestic market), gets carried away by the expansion of capital abroad, then it will be like playing hockey without a goalkeeper. Perhaps we will score pucks in other people's nets, but how many will we let in our own? We have already almost lost our domestic market. The WTO will finally complete this "dirty deed". What kind of innovative or other new economy can we talk about if the domestic market, which in normal countries works up to 90% of the domestic economy, we give to foreigners?

Moderation and accuracy, economy in everything, protection of our national interests always and everywhere, subtle diplomatic play on the contradictions between the powerful of this world, dosed assistance, taking into account our interests in solving their problems - this is what should form the basis of our policy in the coming years, until The US and the West will not be up to us. At the same time, silently and imperceptibly, we must modernize our economy and military forces. Russia has only 7-10 years to do this. And time has gone. In this regard, we must not talk away what should have been done yesterday.

The absence of a clear foreign policy doctrine does not yet allow for warning of possible threats. And there can be no clear foreign policy doctrine without a clear strategy for the internal development of the state. The United States and the West have already become accustomed to disregarding Russia (what is Russia, they do not reckon with the UN either). Therefore, we will continue to find ourselves in an uncomfortable position. In these cases, you can not hesitate and pro-

show excessive "flexibility of the back", otherwise we will constantly find ourselves turned to events "backwards". And in order to get out of this pose with dignity, one must have a filigree technique or know 1001 tales of Shahrazade. Something Vladimir Putin has learned.

There are enough examples. Despite Russia's outrage over the Kosovo events, in late 1999, Vladimir Putin, while still prime minister, immediately after the invasion of Chechnya, made an important demarche towards the United States. He was concerned about Chechen ties to al-Qaeda and the fact that Afghanistan, ruled by the Taliban, was the only country in the world to establish diplomatic relations with Chechnya. Guided by these security interests, and not by a sudden “flash of love” for the United States, Putin proposed to establish cooperation between Moscow and Washington in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This initiative fell on prepared soil, as it already had its own background. After the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the US administration had more than enough data to understand the deadly danger Islamic fundamentalists posed to the US.

At one time, Clinton and his advisers, irritated by Russian opposition in the Balkans and the removal of reformers from key positions in Moscow, ignored this factor of cooperation with Russia. The United States then still viewed Russia not as a potential partner, but as a nostalgic, incompetent, financially weak state, and sought to provide the United States with maximum benefits at the expense of Russia. Under Clinton, the United States tried to consolidate the results of the collapse of the USSR by taking as many post-Soviet states as possible under Washington's wing. Therefore, they "pressed" Georgia to take part in the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, connecting the Caspian Sea with the Mediterranean, bypassing Russia. They encouraged Georgian opportunist President Eduard Shevardnadze to join NATO, gave instructions to American embassies in countries Central Asia counter Russian influence.

That is why in 1999 the United States rejected Putin's proposal for Russian-American counterterrorism cooperation, viewing the Russian proposal as a gesture of a desperate neo-imperialist trying to regain his influence in Central Asia. The Clinton administration did not understand at the time that by doing so it was missing a historic chance to force al-Qaeda and the Taliban

go on the defensive, destroy their bases, and possibly disable major operations. Such cooperation began only after the September 11, 2001 attacks claimed the lives of nearly 3,000 American citizens.

When George W. Bush came to power in January 2001 - eight months after Vladimir Putin became president of Russia - his administration faced new, relatively obscure figures in the Russian leadership. Struggling to distance itself from Clinton's policies, the Bush team did not consider relations with Russia as a priority: many of its representatives considered the Kremlin to be corrupt, undemocratic and weak. While this assessment may have been correct at the time, the Bush administration lacked the strategic foresight to reach out to Moscow. However, personal contacts between Bush and Putin developed successfully. During their first meeting - at the summit in Slovenia in June 2001 - Bush, as we all remember, personally "vouched" for the democratic convictions and spiritual qualities of the new Russian president.

The events of September 11, 2001 radically changed Washington's attitude towards Moscow and evoked in Russia an emotional wave of support and sympathy for the United States. Putin reaffirmed the earlier offer of cooperation in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Russia granted the US Air Force the right to overfly Russian territory, supported the establishment of American bases in Central Asia, and, perhaps most importantly, helped Washington to establish contact with Russian-trained and equipped military formations of the Northern Alliance. Of course, Vladimir Putin acted in the interests of Russia itself. But for Putin, as an aspiring politician, the entry of the United States into the fight against Islamist terrorism was a real gift of fate. Like many other alliances, Russian-American counterterrorism cooperation was based on a convergence of fundamental interests, not a common ideology or mutual sympathy.

Despite such interaction, relations between the two countries remained tense in other areas. Bush's announcement in December 2001 of the United States' withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty - one of the last surviving symbols of Russia's superpower status - once again hurt the Kremlin's pride. Similarly, our animosity towards NATO only intensified when the North Atlantic Alliance annexed the three Baltic states, two of which are Estonia and

Latvia - had territorial disputes with Russia, problems related to the position of the Russian-speaking minority.

Around the same time, Ukraine became a new serious source of mutual tension. There is no doubt that the United States support for Viktor Yushchenko and the Orange Revolution was associated not only with the spread of democracy, but also with the desire to undermine Russian influence in a country that voluntarily joined the Muscovite state in the 17th century, very close to Russia in cultural terms. plan, and had a significant Russian-speaking population. Moreover, many in Russia rightly believe that the current Russian-Ukrainian border - established by Stalin and Khrushchev as the administrative border between the two union republics - stretches far beyond the historical territory of Ukraine, resulting in areas inhabited by millions of Russians, which gives rise to interethnic, linguistic and political problems.

The Bush administration's approach to dealing with Ukraine—namely, its pressure on a divided Ukraine to apply for NATO membership and financial support for non-governmental organizations actively helping pro-presidential political parties—should constantly fuel our concern that whether the United States has moved to a new variant of containment policy towards Russia. Few Bush administration officials or congressmen have thought about the consequences of Russia's opposition in a region as important to its national interests as Ukraine, Crimea, the Black Sea, and on an issue that carries the strongest emotional load.

Georgia soon became another "battlefield" between Moscow and Washington. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili sought to use the support of the West, and especially the United States, as the main tool for restoring Georgia's sovereignty over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where indigenous peoples supported by us have been fighting for independence since the early 1990s. But Saakashvili's ambitions extended much further. He not only demanded the return of two self-proclaimed republics under the control of Tbilisi: he openly positioned himself as the main supporter of “color revolutions” in the post-Soviet region and the overthrow of leaders who sympathize with Russia. He portrayed himself as a pro-democracy activist enthusiastically supporting US foreign policy. Saakashvili went so far as to send Georgian troops to the Allied contingent in 2004

Iraq. Actually, Yushchenko did the same. The fact that he received a suspiciously high number of votes (96%) when he was elected president, and also took control of parliament and television, did not cause much concern outside of Georgia itself. The obvious arbitrariness with which he subjected the leaders of the business community and political rivals to repression did not raise questions. In 2005, when the popular Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania - the only one who still served as a political counterweight to Saakashvili - died under mysterious circumstances (it was alleged that as a result of a gas leak), his family and friends publicly rejected the official version of what happened, transparently hinting that the Saakashvili regime was involved in the death of the politician. If the death of even little-known Russian opposition members causes concern in the United States, then the death of Zhvania or Patar-Katsishvili seems to have been ignored in Washington.

The farce of early resignation from the presidency in 2007, the massacre of the opposition in the center of Tbilisi in November 2007, the falsification of the election results in January 2008, the unexpected death of another of his implacable opponents, Badri Patar-Katsishvili, should have finally , cross out the credibility of Saakashvili as a legitimate president. However, this does not happen. In fact, the Bush administration and influential circles in both parties have constantly supported Saakashvili in the fight against Russia, despite all his excesses. On several occasions, the United States urged him to moderate his ardor so as not to provoke an open military clash with Russia. It is obvious that Washington has chosen Georgia as its main "client state" in the Transcaucasus and near-Caspian region. In the Balkans, Kosovo has been chosen as such a client state.

The United States is supplying arms and training the Georgian military, allowing Saakashvili to take a tougher stance towards Russia; the Georgian military even went so far as to detain and publicly humiliate Russian soldiers stationed in South Ossetia as peacekeepers and stationed on the territory of Georgia itself.

Of course, the behavior of Russia itself in relation to Georgia is far from ideal. Moscow provided Russian citizenship most residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and rather timidly imposed economic sanctions against Georgia.

At the time, Washington's blind support for Saakashvili must have reinforced the perception that the goal of US policy was to undermine the already sharply weakened Russian influence in the region, as a result of which, in August 2008, a military conflict was provoked on the Georgian side with

Russia. The US is more interested not so much in supporting the leaders of democracies as such, but in using them as a tool to isolate Russia in the post-Soviet space.

Despite rising tensions, Russia has not yet become an adversary to the US. There is still a chance to prevent further deterioration of relations between the two countries. This requires a sober assessment of US goals in the post-Soviet region and an analysis of the situation in those numerous areas where the interests of the United States and Russia coincide - especially in matters of combating terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons. mass destruction. Skillful diplomacy will also be required in cases where the goals of both countries are the same, but tactical approaches differ, for example, in relation to the Iranian nuclear program.

But most importantly, the US must recognize that it no longer enjoys unlimited influence over Russia. Today, Washington is simply not in a position to impose its will on Moscow, as it did in the 1990s. A number of influential members of the US Congress reasonably note that it is precisely anti-terror and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that should be the defining directions of Russian-American relations. Another priority issue is stability in Russia itself, where there are thousands of nuclear warheads. Russia's support for sanctions - and, if necessary, the use of force - against "destructive states" and terrorist groups would also be a major help for Washington.

The United States is also interested in spreading and deepening democratic practices in the post-Soviet region, but it is already naive to expect Russia to support its efforts to introduce American democracy. Therefore, Washington will continue to strive to ensure that no one, including Russia, prevents other countries from choosing a democratic form of government and independently making foreign policy (pro-American) decisions. However, the United States will have to understand that its options for this task are limited.

Russia, benefiting from high energy prices, while pursuing a prudent financial policy, having reined in the "oligarchs", no longer needs large-scale foreign loans and economic assistance. Despite the growing tension in interstate relations with the West, large-scale foreign investments are beginning to “flow” into Russia willingly. As long as stability and relative material well-being are maintained in Russia itself, a newfound sense of pride in one's country will

curb popular discontent by tightening state control and gross manipulations in the political sphere.

The negative image of the United States and its Western allies in Russian society, reasonably supported by the authorities, sharply limits the ability of the United States to create a "base of support" for its recommendations regarding internal processes in the country. In the current environment, Washington can only make it clear to Moscow in no uncertain terms that domestic political repression is incompatible with a long-term partnership with the United States. Nor does it help the cause that the reputation of the United States itself as a moral model has been seriously damaged in recent years. Moreover, Moscow's suspicion of Washington's intentions is only growing today. In a number of cases, Moscow began to reflexively perceive with apprehension even those decisions that are not directed against Russia. In general, this is not so bad in the current situation around Russia.

While Moscow itself views the West with suspicion, Russia's use of its energy resources for political purposes is outraged by Western governments, not to mention neighboring countries who are completely dependent on energy supplies from Russia.

Russia, of course, must continue to actively use the energy leverage as a political means. Unfortunately, only Gazprom is in the hands of the government so far. But, apparently, in the future, if necessary, the matter may reach the oil companies, in particular, Rosneft today has become a giant on a global scale.

Undoubtedly, Gazprom supplies energy carriers to friendly states at preferential prices. In essence, Russia is simply rewarding countries that maintain special political and economic relations with it by selling oil and gas to them at below-market prices. Of course, politically we can come to terms with the "NATO" choice of neighboring countries, but Russia is not obliged to subsidize them after that. It must always be borne in mind that when Washington reacts with noble indignation to Russia's "politicized" use of its energy resources, it does not look too sincere: after all, no state imposes economic sanctions against others as often and with such enthusiasm as the United States.

The United States constantly accused Russia of obstructionist actions on Kosovo, but Moscow's publicly voiced position was that it would accept any agreement reached by the Kosovars and Serbia. Moscow has never dissuaded Belgrade from an agreement with Kosovo. But also to recognize one

Russia had no intention of declaring Kosovo's independence earlier. After Kosovo's self-declaration of independence, the situation changed dramatically. The United States and Western allies "spit" on international law on the UN Security Council, on Russia. This should untie Russia's hands. From the decision of the unrecognized republics on the territory of the former USSR, in particular Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and later Transnistria, to gain independence without the consent of the states from which they wanted to secede, Moscow will only benefit. Many in Russia are content that Kosovo's fate has set a precedent for unrecognized post-Soviet territories, most of which yearn for independence and eventual integration with Russia. And here there is no need for Russia to hold on to the letter of international law, which was not violated by us.

A number of other disagreements on foreign policy issues only exacerbate tensions. Russia, for example, did not support Washington's decision to invade Iraq, and the same position was taken by some key US NATO allies, in particular France and Germany. Russia has been supplying conventional weapons to some states that the US considers hostile, such as Iran, Syria and Venezuela, but it does so on a commercial basis without violating international law. It is understandable that the United States may perceive such actions as provocative, but many Russians feel the same way about American military supplies to Georgia.

Contrary to its interests, Russia should stop participating in the policy of soft "curbing" of Iran and North Korea. On the one hand, Russia does not go as far as the US and Europe would like, and, in the end, still supports the imposition of sanctions against both countries.

There are a lot of disagreements between the US and Russia, but this does not mean that Russia is an enemy of the US. And the main thing here is that Russia does not support Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups waging war against America, and is no longer spreading a “competing” ideology, aiming at world hegemony, as it was in the days of the USSR. In addition, Russia has never invaded or threatened to invade the territory of any of the neighboring countries. Finally, Russia has decided not to fan separatist sentiments in Ukraine, despite the existence of a significant and very active Russian minority in that country.

The main thing for Russia is to accept that the United States is the most powerful power in the world, and there is no point in provoking it unnecessarily. However, it makes no sense for Russia to adapt to American preferences anymore, especially to the detriment of its own interests.

International position of modern Russia (90s)

The collapse of the USSR changed Russia's position in the international arena. First of all, Russia had to be recognized as the legal successor of the former Soviet Union in the UN. Almost all states recognized Russia. Including the recognition of Russia's sovereignty, the transfer to it of the rights and obligations of the former USSR in 1993-1994. said countries of the European Community (EU). Agreements on partnership and cooperation were concluded between the EU states and the Russian Federation.

The Russian government joined the NATO-proposed Partnership for Peace program, subsequently agreeing with NATO on a separate agreement.

At the same time, Russia could not remain indifferent to the attempts of Eastern European countries to join NATO. Moreover, the NATO leadership has published a document formulating the conditions for the expansion of this bloc. Any country wishing to join NATO must be prepared to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on its territory. It became obvious that the only power in the world claiming global intervention in the affairs of other countries is the United States.

In 1996, Russia joined the Council of Europe (established in 1949, unites 39 European states), which was responsible for issues of culture, human rights, protection environment. However, during the events in Chechnya, Russia began to be subjected to discriminatory criticism in the Council of Europe, which raised the question for Russia about the advisability of its participation in this organization.

The dynamism of international events required constant maneuvering from Russian diplomacy. Russia became a member of the regular annual meetings of the "Big Seven" (after Russia's entry into the membership - " big eight”) - the leaders of the leading developed countries of the world, where the most important political and economic issues are discussed. On the whole, ties with France, Great Britain, Italy, and especially with Germany developed positively (after the withdrawal of Russian troops in 1994 from the territory of the former GDR).

Access to partnerships with the United States, countries Western Europe took place in parallel with the turn of Russia "face" to the East. Russia is a major power and the center of Eurasia. Naturally, its geopolitical strategy should be based on an equal attitude towards the countries of both the West and the East. The policy of "Eurocentrism", pursued during the years of "perestroika" under Gorbachev's slogan "Enter the European home", was perceived with caution by the leaders of the eastern countries, and caused bewilderment among the population of the Asian regions of Russia. Therefore, the mutual visits of the heads of state of Russia and China (treaties and agreements of 1997-2001), the strengthening of relations with India (treaty of 2001) became a serious contribution to improving the international climate, to the development of the concept of a multipolar world, as opposed to the US claims to establish a "new world order."

Very important in relations between Russia and far-abroad countries, and above all the United States, is the question of the role of nuclear weapons in maintaining peace and security. Although the economic status of Russia has fallen, but in terms of nuclear weapons, it still retains the position of the USSR as a superpower. The political leaders of modern Russia were accepted on an equal footing by the G8, NATO. In this regard, the ratification in 2000 by the Third State Duma of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-2) concluded in 1992 between Russia and the United States raised questions from civilian and military experts who believed that this was a unilateral concession in favor of the United States. For the elimination from the Russian defensive arsenal by 2003 was subject to the most formidable ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles SS-18 (they are based in almost invulnerable mines and are on combat duty in the variant of 10 individually targetable multiple warheads). The presence of these weapons in Russia forces the other side to comply with the agreements on the reduction of nuclear stocks and missile defense.

In 2002, in connection with the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Russian side announced the termination of obligations under the START-2 Treaty.

Foreign economic relations developed, Russia's trade with foreign countries. Our country supplies oil, gas and natural resources in exchange for food and consumer goods. At the same time, the states of the Middle East, Latin America, and Southeast Asia are showing interest in Russia's participation in the construction of hydroelectric plants, metallurgical enterprises, and agricultural facilities.

Relations with the CIS states occupy an important place in the foreign policy activities of the Government of the Russian Federation. In January 1993, the Charter of the Commonwealth was adopted. At first, negotiations on issues related to the division of the property of the former USSR occupied a central place in relations between the countries. Borders were established with those countries that introduced national currencies. Agreements were signed that determined the conditions for the transportation of Russian goods through the territory of the CIS countries to far abroad countries.

The collapse of the USSR destroyed traditional economic ties with the former republics. Trade with the CIS countries is developing, but has a number of problems. Perhaps the most acute is the following: Russia continues to supply the former republics with fuel and energy resources, primarily oil and gas, for which the Commonwealth states cannot pay. Their financial debt is growing in billions of dollars.

The Russian leadership seeks to maintain integration ties between the former republics within the CIS. On his initiative, the Interstate Committee of the Commonwealth countries was created with the center of residence in Moscow. Seven states (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) signed an agreement on collective security(May 15, 1992). Russia, in fact, has become the only state that actually performs peacekeeping tasks in the "hot spots" of the CIS (Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Tajikistan).

Interstate relations between Russia and some of the former republics of the USSR were not easy. Conflicts with the governments of the Baltic states are caused by discrimination against the Russian population living there. In relations with Ukraine, there is the problem of Crimea, which, together with the Russian city of Sevastopol, was "gifted" to Ukraine by Khrushchev's voluntaristic decision.

The closest, fraternal ties are developing between Russia and Belarus (contracts of 1997, 2001). Integration relations are developing between them, leading to the formation of a single union state.

It is now clear that Russia can play a greater role in strengthening the economic, political, cultural ties between the CIS states, if it succeeds in its domestic politics, the revival of the national economy, the rise of culture and science. And the authority of Russia in the world as a whole can be ensured by the stable development of its economy and the stability of the internal political situation.

History of Russia [Textbook] Team of authors

16.4. International position and foreign policy

The Russian Federation, after the collapse of the USSR and the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, acted as the legal successor of the USSR on the world stage. Russia took the place of the USSR as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and in other international organizations. However, the changed geopolitical conditions - the collapse of the bipolar East-West system, dominated by the Soviet Union and the United States of America, required the development of a new concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. The most important tasks were to strengthen ties with the leading world powers, deepen the process of integration into the world economy, and be active in international organizations. Another main direction was the strengthening of Russia's position in the CIS countries and the development of fruitful political, economic and cultural cooperation with them within the framework of the Commonwealth, and the protection of the interests of the Russian-speaking population in these countries.

Russia and "Far Abroad"

The next consequence of the collapse USSR there was a sharp reduction in economic, cultural, scientific ties with the Eastern European states. The Russian Federation was faced with the task of establishing with its former allies in the socialist camp new relations based on true equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other's affairs. Russia should have comprehended the changes in the countries of Eastern Europe and determined new principles of political and economic relations with each of them.

However, this process was extremely slow and with great difficulty. After the "velvet" revolutions of 1989, the countries of Eastern Europe intended to quickly join the European Economic Community (EEC) as equal partners. The settlement of relations between Russia and these states was aggravated by serious financial, military and other problems that our country had to solve as the legal successor of the USSR.

The restoration of versatile ties between the Russian Federation and the former allies in the socialist camp began with the signing of mutually beneficial agreements and cooperation agreements with Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic.

The development of Russian-Yugoslav relations was hindered by the ongoing interethnic war in the Balkans. In December 1995, with the active participation of Russia in Paris, a peace treaty was signed between the republics former Yugoslavia, which became an important step towards ending the war. In March 1999, in connection with the problem of the autonomous province of Kosovo and the infliction of NATO rocket strikes Serbia opened a new stage of Russian-Yugoslav rapprochement. The tragic events in the Balkans have shown that without Russia's participation it is impossible to ensure international security and cooperation in Europe.

Fundamental changes have taken place in Russia's relations with leading Western countries. Russia strove for partnership with them and asserted this status through cooperation with everything the international community. Economic cooperation, rather than military confrontation, has become a priority in Russia's foreign policy.

During the state visit of the President of Russia B. N. Yeltsin to the United States of America On February 1, 1992, the Russian-American Declaration on the End of the Cold War was signed, in which it was stated that Russia and the United States "do not consider each other as potential adversaries."

In April 1992, Russia became a member of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which pledged to provide it with financial assistance in the amount of $25 billion to carry out market reforms. Russia also signed a number of other important documents. Among them are the Charter of the Russian-American partnership, the Memorandum of Cooperation on the global system of protection of the world community, the agreement on the joint exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, the agreement on the encouragement and mutual protection of investments. On January 3, 1993, the Russian-American Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-2) was signed in Moscow.

In April 1993, Presidents B. Clinton and B. I. Yeltsin met in the United States. As a result, a special commission was formed to coordinate Russian-American relations, headed by US Vice President A. Gore and Russian Prime Minister V. S. Chernomyrdin. In order to further develop economic ties between the two countries, the US-Russian Business Council and the Council for Trade and Economic Cooperation of the CIS-USA (STEC) were established

Simultaneously with economic ties, Russian-American contacts in the military field developed. In 1993, the United States abandoned the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) project. In December 1994, an agreement was signed on the mutual control of nuclear weapons. In March 1997, during a meeting of the presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States in Helsinki, a statement was adopted on the parameters for reducing nuclear missile weapons.

In order to strengthen relations with the leading world powers, Russia sought to use the opportunities international organizations. In May 1997, an agreement "on a special partnership" between the Russian Federation and NATO was signed in Paris. In June of the same year, Russia took part in the meeting of the leaders of the G7 states, held in Denver (USA), which includes the USA, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, France, Italy and Canada. The heads of these states hold annual meetings to discuss global problems economic policy. An agreement was reached to transform it into the G8 with the participation of the Russian Federation.

In the same period, Russia strengthened ties with leading European countries - UK, Germany and France. In November 1992, a package of documents on bilateral relations between Britain and Russia was signed. Both powers reaffirmed their commitment to democracy and partnership. Similar bilateral agreements were reached with Germany, France, Italy, Spain and other European states. In January 1996, Russia was admitted to the Council of Europe. This organization was established in 1949 to promote integration processes in the field of human rights. Russia joined the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Inter-parliamentary ties with European states were actively developed.

In the 1990s has changed significantly eastern politics Russia. The national-state interests of Russia required the establishment of new relations not only with the United States and Europe, but also with industrial developed countries Asia-Pacific region. They were supposed to ensure stability and security on the eastern borders of Russia, create favorable external conditions for its active inclusion in regional integration processes. The result of this policy was the revival of bilateral relations with China, the Republic of Korea, India, etc. Russia became a member of the Pacific Economic Cooperation (TPC) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organizations

The main issue of Russia's foreign policy in the Far East was the strengthening of good neighborly relations. with China. During his presidency, B.N. Yeltsin visited this country four times - in 1992, 1996,1997 and 1999. Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Moscow in 1997 and 1998. With the active participation of the Russian Federation in 1996, the "Shanghai Five" was created to coordinate political and economic ties, which included Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

One of the leading directions of Russia's foreign policy in the East was the improvement of relations with Japan. In October 1993, the President of the Russian Federation paid an official visit to Japan, during which they signed a Declaration on the Prospects for Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Relations, a Memorandum on Japan's assistance in accelerating reforms in Russia, and a Memorandum on the provision of humanitarian aid Russian Federation. The following year, 1994, a Memorandum was signed on the establishment of a Russian-Japanese intergovernmental commission on trade and economic issues. In 1997–1998 agreements were reached between Russia and Japan on expanding financial and investment cooperation, on the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, protecting the environment, disposing of Russian weapons in the Far East, etc. At the same time, the establishment of good neighborly relations with Japan was complicated by the problem of the Kuril Islands. Japan put forward the return of the islands as an indispensable condition for improving relations with Russia.

The Russian Federation pursued an active policy in the Near and Middle East. Here Russia maintained friendly relations with Egypt, Syria, Iran and Iraq. In 1994, an agreement was concluded on the basics of relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey. As a result, by the end of the 20th century trade turnover between the two countries increased fivefold; in 2000, more than 100 Turkish companies operated in Russia. Russia initiated the creation of an international association - the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC).

After the collapse of the USSR, they found themselves in the background of the Russian foreign policy of the state Africa and Latin America. Almost stopped international meetings on highest level. The exception was the visit of Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov in November 1997, during which he visited Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Costa Rica. He signed a number of documents on economic and cultural cooperation with these countries.

Commonwealth of Independent States

The principles of relations between the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States were set forth in the Declaration on its formation dated December 21, 1991. Azerbaijan and Moldova, which did not ratify the Declaration, remained outside the framework of the CIS. In 1992, the CIS countries signed over 200 documents on friendship and cooperation, and agreements were reached on the creation of 30 coordinating bodies. The bilateral agreements concluded by Russia with the Commonwealth countries included obligations on mutual respect for national independence and territorial integrity, “transparency of borders”, cooperation in ensuring peace and security, a common economic space, environmental protection, etc. Signed in May 1992 at the Tashkent meeting of the leaders of Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Uzbekistan, an agreement on the collective security of these countries for a period of five years.

The CIS countries had great potential for economic cooperation. The geographical proximity and contiguity of the territories suggested their natural trade, economic and political partnership. This was facilitated by long-term mutual production, scientific and technical ties, unified energy and transport systems.

The participating states have developed common positions on such an important issue as the creation of peacekeeping forces within the Commonwealth. The leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan showed the greatest consistency and activity in this. In 1994, the President of Kazakhstan, N.A. Nazarbayev, proposed the formation of the Eurasian Union within the former USSR. March 29, 1996 Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia signed an agreement "On deepening integration in the economic and humanitarian fields", in 1999 - "On the customs union and a single economic space."

After the signing of the Commonwealth Charter in January 1993 in Minsk by seven CIS member countries, work began on further strengthening the forms of cooperation between them. In September 1993, an agreement was signed on the establishment of the Economic Union of the Commonwealth. In 1997, the Customs Union was formed, in 1999 - the Economic Council. The CIS partner countries united time-tested economic, cultural, educational ties, common international and regional interests, and the desire to ensure political, economic and social stability.

Belarus and the Russian Federation have gone through a significant, albeit difficult, path of strengthening comprehensive interstate ties. On April 2, 1996, an agreement was signed in Moscow on the formation of the Community of Belarus and Russia. In May 1997, the Community was transformed into the Union of Russia and Belarus. The Charter of the Union was adopted. In December 1998, Presidents B. N. Yeltsin and A. G. Lukashenko signed the Declaration on the Establishment of the Union State of Russia and Belarus. For 1996–1999 Russian regions signed more than 110 contracts and agreements with the government, regional bodies of Belarus and about 45 with ministries and departments of the republic.

In May 1997, agreements were signed in Kyiv with Ukraine on the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the principles of its basing in Sevastopol. At the same time, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Russia and Ukraine was signed. Presidents B. Yeltsin and L. Kuchma adopted the "Program of long-term economic cooperation for 1998-2007."

Russia has signed similar agreements on long-term economic cooperation with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

After the collapse of the USSR, relations with the Baltic republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia were the most difficult. The governments and leaders of these states did not seek political and economic cooperation with Russia, they pursued a pro-Western policy. In the Baltic countries, there have been numerous cases of violation of the rights of Russian citizens, who make up a significant part of the population in them.

However, in the relationship between Russian Federation and other CIS countries, significant difficulties persisted. Many of the agreements reached on cooperation were not fulfilled. Thus, out of almost 900 documents adopted by the Commonwealth bodies during the first eight years of its existence, no more than one tenth was implemented. Moreover, there has been a trend towards a reduction in political, economic and cultural ties. Each of the CIS countries was guided primarily by its own national interests. The instability of relations within the Commonwealth was negatively affected by the unstable alignment of political forces in most of the CIS states. The behavior of the leaders of the former Soviet republics not only did not contribute, but even sometimes hindered the establishment of relations of friendship, good neighborliness and mutually beneficial partnership. Suspicion was manifested in relation to each other, mutual distrust grew. In many respects, such phenomena were due to disagreements over the division of the property of the former Soviet Union - the Black Sea Fleet and determining the status of Sevastopol, weapons and military equipment in Ukraine and Moldova, the Baikonur space center in Kazakhstan, etc. All this turned into severe crisis manifestations in the CIS countries: economy, the standard of living of the population fell.

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Against this complex background of chronic instability and volatility in the international situation, Russian foreign policy stood out especially clearly. Even the most irreconcilable critics of Moscow are forced to admit that in the outgoing year the Russian line in international affairs was characterized by continuity and consistency. Far from everyone on the world stage, Russia looks like a convenient partner, but it can by no means be reproached for being an unreliable and unpredictable partner. This undeniable advantage over some other great powers inspires the respect not only of our friends and allies, but also of our adversaries and opponents.

Apparently, the coming 2020 will be characterized by a further decrease in the stability of the global system. Of course, I would like to be mistaken, but the energy of the collapse of the old system of international relations has clearly not yet been fully exhausted. It is unlikely that it will be possible to stop the chain reaction of decay so quickly - this is not a task for a year or two, but for a long historical perspective. And the task is not for one or a group of leading world countries, but for the entire international community as a whole, which, for a variety of reasons, is not yet ready to take it seriously.

Under these conditions, a natural temptation may arise to limit Russia's participation in international affairs as much as possible, to fence itself off from the unpredictable and dangerous outside world, and to focus on solving internal problems. The unwillingness to “import instability”, to become unwitting hostages of those negative processes and trends in world politics, which we are unable to manage and which no one is able to control, is understandable. The society's request for the country's leadership to focus on our internal problems, which, unfortunately, we still have in abundance, is also understandable.

But the strategy of self-isolation, even if temporary and partial, is dangerous in at least two respects. First, consistent self-isolation in today's interdependent world is almost impossible, except for such rare exceptions as North Korea. And for Russia, deeply integrated into global political, economic and social processes, any attempts at self-isolation will inevitably mean the rejection of many of the most important achievements of our foreign policy over the past 30 years. And, moreover, they will significantly slow down the solution of those internal tasks on which it is proposed to focus.

On the world stage, Russia does not look like a convenient partner for everyone, but it cannot be reproached for being an unreliable and unpredictable partner.

Secondly, the strategy of self-isolation will in fact also mean Russia's self-withdrawal from active participation in the creation new system international relations, in the construction of a new world order. And the creation of this new world order is inevitable in any case - the main questions are only in terms and in the price that humanity will have to pay for this world order. When the era of instability is left behind and global governance is restored in one way or another, we will have to play by the rules developed by someone else and reflecting the interests not of Russia, but of other participants in world politics.

Therefore, Russian foreign policy in the coming year, it seems, should not be limited to solving predominantly current, operational tasks in various regions of the world, although the importance of these tasks can hardly be overestimated. But no less important is the development of new principles, models and mechanisms of international cooperation for the future. Figuratively speaking, if today it is too early to start building the building of a new world order, then it is possible and necessary to select individual “bricks” and even entire building blocks for this future building today. There is something to rely on in this complex work of Russian foreign policy.

For example, in Syria, our country has accumulated a unique experience of multilateral diplomacy, which makes it possible to bring together the positions of seemingly most irreconcilable adversaries and achieve a steady reduction in the intensity of military confrontation. Russia has managed to achieve in Syria what very many not so long ago considered unattainable in principle. Obviously, in the coming year it is worth trying to extend this practice to the Middle East region as a whole, consistently developing and concretizing the Russian concept of a regional system of collective security, which is undoubtedly in demand in the Middle East.

In Asia, Russia and its partners were able to take serious steps towards building a fundamentally new democratic and open system of international institutions. Among recent achievements, suffice it to mention the expansion of the SCO, the promotion of the BRICS+ concept, the activation of the trilateral format of the RIC (Russia, India, China), impressive progress on the path of conjugation of the development of the EAEU and the Chinese One Belt, One Road project. Apparently, it is especially important here to fill the new institutional forms with concrete content. Russia, hosting the 2020 BRICS and SCO summits on its territory, could confirm its leading role in expanding the "project portfolio" of these organizations.

Russian-Chinese relations are confidently becoming an influential factor in the entire system of international relations. A further increase in the level of coordination between Russia and China in the international arena, including in the field of security, will continue to strengthen their authority and influence in world affairs.

In the European direction, the outgoing 2019, although it did not become a turning point for the better for Moscow, nevertheless brought certain positive results. Russia returned to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. It was possible to achieve common approaches of Russia and the West to resolve the political crisis in Moldova. After a long break, the mechanism of Normandy Four summits on a settlement in Donbass began to work. There has been progress in trilateral negotiations with Ukraine and the European Union on energy issues.

Europe is entering a stage of deep rethinking of its model of regional integration. And it's not just about the upcoming exit of the UK from European Union. On the agenda are acute issues of socio-economic development, regionalization, security issues, etc. Against this background, a serious political dialogue on the future of relations between Russia and Europe in all strategic areas of our relations is becoming more than in demand. And such a dialogue must begin without delay.

In the United States, the 2020 election campaign is already in full swing - not the best best time for trying to start mending our bilateral relationship. But one cannot agree with those who believe that Moscow should take a break in these relations, waiting for the results of the presidential elections and the US exit from the deep political crisis that split American society three years ago. History shows that waiting for the “opportune moment” can last forever, and there are always plenty of good reasons to extend the pause again and again. If contacts with the executive branch of the United States are objectively difficult today, then we need to intensify our activity along other lines, including on the second track of our relations.

In relations with Africa, 2019 was a breakthrough year - the Sochi Russia-Africa summit not only demonstrated the existence of mutual interest in developing cooperation, but also revealed the potential for such cooperation. Now the main thing is that the momentum received does not go into the sand, and therefore 2020 in this sense should become a year of practical steps.

These and many other problems will face Russian foreign policy in 2020. Our country has already demonstrated the skills of an effective crisis manager capable of coping with the most serious current challenges to regional and global security. In addition to these skills, Russia has the opportunity to demonstrate the ability of an experienced design engineer who, together with his partners, is ready to design individual components and entire assemblies of a complex and as yet unfinished mechanism of the new world order.

2020 will be held under the banner of the 75th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic war and World War II. Looking back, it is impossible not to note that already in 1945, far from us, the victorious powers, despite deep differences on the most fundamental issues world development, were able to agree not only on the general rules of the game on the world stage, but also on the creation of a whole system of international institutions that guarantee the preservation of global and regional stability. This system, with all its shortcomings and imperfections, served mankind for many decades.

Today, the international community faces challenges comparable in scale to those of the middle of the last century. I would like to hope that modern politics, like their great predecessors, are aware of their historical responsibility and demonstrate state wisdom in the interests of resolving the pressing problems of our time.