Output from Afghanistan. Did the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan take place as winners or losers? Afghan war casualties

Hobby
08.11.2019

Now it is no secret to anyone that even after February 15, 1989, when the final withdrawal of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops from Afghanistan was officially announced, not all of our military left this country. According to the agreement, Soviet troops remained there for some time. missile battalions, military advisers continued to work, the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, headed by General of the Army Valentin Varennikov. And a week before the “last” Shuravi leaving Afghanistan over the bridge across the Amu Darya is shown on TV, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Colonel General Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareev will arrive in Kabul with a small (about 25 people) operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense - now army general (this title will be awarded to him in November 1989), president of the Academy of Military Sciences. On the eve of the 25th anniversary of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, a correspondent met with him "Red Star"...

- Comrade General of the Army, in the summer of 1989, as a special correspondent of the Red Star, I happened to participate in the withdrawal of the 860th separate motorized rifle regiment of the Pskov Red Banner, stationed in the province of Badakhshan. At that time, it was our last outpost remaining in the northeast of Afghanistan, and its withdrawal did not go smoothly, to put it mildly. On the 220-kilometer stretch from Faizabad to Kunduz, which the regiment crossed on its own, there were up to a dozen destroyed bridges, a lot of blockages, flooding areas, and 40 kilometers of the road was a continuous minefield. Yes, and "spirits" in some places "reminded" of themselves. At least, the soldiers of the 345th separate airborne regiment under the command of the Hero who ensured our withdrawal Soviet Union Lieutenant Colonel Valery Vostrotin was never to be bored.

It was at the first stage of withdrawal. And what can be said about the operation for the return of our troops from Afghanistan as a whole?

- In general, the operation was organized and, with rare exceptions, without hostilities. Even before it began, on the initiative of the command of the 40th Army, contacts were intensified with the field commanders of the Mujahideen and the local population. Our commanders and political workers held meetings with the elders of nearby villages, local residents were assisted with fuel and food. True, some irreconcilable representatives of the Afghan opposition nevertheless intended to arrange a final bloody massacre for Shuravi, but they were not supported even among the Mujahideen. The leaders of the opposition were interested in the quickest withdrawal of our troops, believing that after that they would become masters of the situation in the country.

Although, of course, not everything, as you noticed, went smoothly. There were some skirmishes. There were no losses. Especially at the second stage: in January and the first half of February 1989, 39 Soviet soldiers were killed during the withdrawal. In general, according to available data, our army lost in Afghanistan (killed, died from wounds and diseases, died as a result of various incidents) 13,833 people, KGB units - 572, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28, other departments - 20 people. The total death toll, including 190 military advisers, specialists and translators who worked in the Afghan army, is 14,453. Sanitary losses amounted to 49,983 people, of which 38,614 (77 percent) were returned to service by our glorious doctors. 6,669 people became disabled.

- And the 179 military camps (32 garrisons), which we generously left in Afghanistan with all the barracks and housing stock, utilities and equipment, are these also our losses?

- As for the material side of the matter, three-month supplies of ammunition, food, automobile, aviation and diesel fuel and other means in the amount of more than 85 thousand tons must be added to the military camps. Stocks were laid at the bases and warehouses of the Afghan army and our warehouses, transferred to the Afghan side, in 12 garrisons, as well as at the transshipment bases of Hairatan and Turugundi. In addition, 990 units were transferred to the Afghan army. armored vehicles, about 3,000 vehicles, 142 artillery pieces, 82 mortars, 43 rocket artillery units, 231 anti-aircraft weapons, 14,443 units small arms, 1.706 grenade launchers and other types of weapons and equipment. Unfortunately, due to disorganization, corruption and poor control by the Afghan command, these stocks did not reach the full volume of some units and units. Some of them were sold or fell into the hands of the rebels during transportation. As a result, as it turned out later, immediately after the withdrawal of our troops in a number of units of the Afghan army, difficulties in providing food, fuel, lubricants and ammunition began to be acutely felt.

- Makhmut Akhmetovich, as you know, the withdrawal of troops was carried out in accordance with the Geneva agreements concluded in April 1988 on a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. But it is also known that not all parties acted as agreed ...

— The Geneva agreements included a number of documents. The main thing in them was the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the cessation of outside interference in the internal affairs of the country. The Soviet side and the central government of Afghanistan strictly adhered to the agreements, and on May 15, as expected, the first units of our troops departed for their homeland. At the same time, the US, Pakistan and some other countries grossly violated the terms of the agreements. The White Paper published in 1988 by the Afghan Foreign Ministry cites numerous facts of such violations. In particular, only within the first month after the signing of the Geneva Accords, the Mujahideen based in Pakistan were supplied with several times more weapons and ammunition than had been supplied before. More than 200 training centers for the training of militants for opposition formations continued to operate on the territory of Pakistan. The armed actions did not stop either. Two months after the start of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the Mujahideen undertook 2,914 such actions. Only from May to August, 200 rockets were fired at Kabul. There were also shelling and attacks on our military units.

- Nevertheless, no matter how difficult the way home was, after August 15, 1988 (the end date of the first phase of the withdrawal), our garrisons remained only in six provinces - Kabul, Herat, Parvan, Samangan, Balkh, Baghlan.

- Yes, the contingent, which numbered 100.3 thousand people by the beginning of May, decreased to 50.1 thousand. Well, then, for reasons beyond the control of the army, there was a break. In view of the fact that Pakistan did not fulfill its obligations, and the Mujahideen did not go for a peaceful settlement, the President of Afghanistan, Najibullah, began to insist that in Kabul and on the main Kabul-Hairatan supply road Soviet troops up to 10-15 thousand people. In order to somehow neutralize the noise about this, it was proposed to call them volunteers. Under pressure from Najibullah, the commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov, was even given a preliminary order to suspend the withdrawal of troops. However, later it was canceled, and the withdrawal continued.

- And at this time, from the territory of the USSR, our aviation inflicts a series of massive strikes on an empty, as it turned out, place in the north-east of Afghanistan. What for?

- Najibullah was particularly concerned about the strong grouping of the armed forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud in the north-east of Afghanistan. From its side, the greatest threat arose to Kabul, as well as the danger of intercepting the Kabul-Hairaton road and the Salang Pass. Proceeding from this, and possibly with the aim of provoking Ahmad Shah to take active steps and delay the withdrawal of our troops, he turned to the Soviet leadership with a request to launch air strikes on the areas where his detachments were based. And from January 24 to February 15, 1989, despite the objections of General of the Army Varennikov and the command of the 40th Army, such an operation was carried out. But with the beginning of the first raids, Masud withdrew his main forces to relatively safe places, hiding them in the gorges. In addition, there was no accurate intelligence, since the intelligence of the 40th Army had already been curtailed by that time. So the air strikes did not give significant results. Instead, they damaged the ongoing process of national reconciliation and pushed Ahmad Shah to gather his strength and step up fighting their detachments after the withdrawal of our troops.

“Thus, having arrived in Kabul as the chief military adviser to the President of Afghanistan, you ended up, as they say, from the ship to the ball - the situation in the country clearly did not promise a peaceful life ...

— In fact, I had already been to Afghanistan before that. The first time was in the fall of 1980, when we flew there with General of the Army Valentin Ivanovich Varennikov. In 1981, when the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense was headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Leonidovich Sokolov and General of the Army Sergei Fedorovich Akhromeev, I happened to work for some time in the troops of the 40th Army, as well as in the Afghan units. Then I went there in 1985 and 1987. So he was, as they say, in the know.

In addition, before leaving, I had a number of meetings and conversations with officials from various departments dealing with Afghanistan's affairs, I got acquainted with the reports of representatives of the Foreign Ministry, the KGB, the Main Intelligence Directorate, military advisers, and foreign press reports. True, the essence of all this information boiled down to the fact that in connection with the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the government circles of the Republic of Afghanistan are in a state of shock and there is no hope that the Najibullah regime can hold out even for several months. Actually, the Minister of Defense of the USSR, General of the Army Dmitry Timofeevich Yazov himself, admonishing me before the road, said: "Work for 2-3 months, and then we'll see." As it turned out, I had to work there until the autumn of 1990.

And we arrived in Afghanistan on February 7, 1989. The situation was really difficult: government troops, accustomed to relying on our 40th Army and military advisers in everything, now had to independently confront the armed opposition. At our first meeting with Najibullah, he unexpectedly asked me in an ironic manner: “How dare you come to us at a time when there are no more Soviet troops, how are we going to hold on?” I replied that there has long been a saying in the Russian army: "A good commander can build one Tatar in two lines." Let us, they say, try all together, like Muslims, to double our ranks and strain our strength to the last possible. By the way, two days after this meeting, our intelligence officers handed me a newspaper brought from Pakistan, which reported that "a hundred thousand Russians were taken out of Afghanistan - one Tatar was brought in."

Without going into the details of the activities of our operational group, I must say that its small number of personnel really worked with full exertion. Our officers participated in planning the operations of government troops, organized the escort of their columns to the combat zones and through the territories captured by the rebels, assisted the leadership of ministries and departments of the republic in organizing communications, as well as practical help commanders of units and subunits in organizing combat operations. Often had to risk their lives, several people were wounded and shell-shocked. I also remember with gratitude the USSR Ambassadors to Afghanistan, Yuli Mikhailovich Vorontsov and Boris Nikolaevich Pastukhov, from whom we constantly felt understanding and support.
Unfortunately, as subsequent events showed, not all the measures and recommendations worked out jointly by us and the Afghan leadership were implemented. Although, as we know, despite all the prophecies and incredible difficulties, thanks to the political support, economic and military assistance of the USSR, the Republic of Afghanistan held out for three whole years.

"Could you hold on some more?"

- I think if our policy towards the Najibullah regime, the Mujahideen and the situation in Afghanistan in general were more adequate to the current situation and the prospects for its development, and if the help from Russia and other CIS countries corresponded to the help received by the opposition from outside, the republic would still be could hold on and resist. With the departure of the Soviet troops, the opposition forces were deprived of the main thing - a common enemy, the fight against which united their various groups under the banner of a holy war against the infidels. As a result, internal contradictions intensified in the opposition camp, and a struggle for leadership began. Under such conditions, it was much easier for government troops to resist the enemy.

In truth, it is now difficult to judge how the situation could have developed if its main patrons had not turned their backs on the Najibullah government. But in any case, I agree with Boris Nikolayevich Pastukhov: we should have been more concerned about having a state in the south in the form of Afghanistan, if not a friendly, then at least a neutral state. In fact, Afghanistan was betrayed, it was left to the mercy of fate. The Geneva Accords did not work. The Soviet troops left, the Soviet bases in Afghanistan were destroyed, and all the military bases and training centers of the Mujahideen in Pakistan remained. Military assistance to Afghanistan was stopped, and the supply of weapons to the Mujahideen continued. In the end, power in the country was in the hands of the Taliban. Najibullah was executed. Then the Americans got involved in the war with the Taliban, and the problems of the region became even more acute than at the time of the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops, and the flames of a new, no less bloody war flared up on the southern approaches of Russia, which still remains unfinished.

- Makhmut Akhmetovich, and yet for those who were "across the river", the war is over. In their honor, the Russian Union of Afghan Veterans and the organizing committee for the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the final withdrawal of Soviet troops established a medal. And in December we will celebrate the 35th anniversary of their entry into Afghanistan. True, there are still disputes about the appropriateness of this step. Some consider the involvement of Soviet troops in that war almost a crime. Others advocate giving it the status of military operations in defense of the Fatherland, an armed clash with international terrorist forces. The leader of the RSVA, Deputy Chairman of the Duma Committee on Defense Franz Klintsevich, in his speeches, proposes to revise the assessments of that war, given by the deputies in hot pursuit. What do you think of all this?

- Irrespective of the above proposal, I would like to once again, since I have repeatedly had to speak on this topic, including in the Red Star, to note: in general, it has become fashionable for us not only to revise, but also to rewrite the pages of history. So, over time, we can turn into the notorious Ivanovs, who do not remember kinship.

Probably, in a different way, from the standpoint of today, one can look at our almost ten-year-old Afghan suffering, through which hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers have passed. But let's judge the actions of the Soviet Union in relation to Afghanistan in the late 1970s, based on those specific historical conditions, and not on the basis of the so-called universal values ​​invented later. Moreover, in our time, all leading states prefer to proceed not from abstract universal values, but, above all, from their national interests.

Yes, today it is no longer a secret to anyone that the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in 1979 was a politically erroneous step that inflicted enormous damage on both the Afghan people and the Soviet Union. However, let's not forget that the Soviet leadership did not operate in a vacuum either. Many external circumstances pushed him to this fatal step. It is well known, for example, how intensely and actively the United States of America tried to penetrate and gain a foothold in Iran and Pakistan, creating their bases there. In turn, Iran, Pakistan and some other states supported the opposition forces that opposed King Mohammed Zahir Shah, the Daoud government even before the April revolution in Afghanistan, which created a serious threat to the USSR in the south.

Could the Soviet Union, under these conditions, not react in any way to what was happening in Afghanistan? For any state that respects its own interests, this would be unnatural and irresponsible. Even if the Soviet leadership had renounced all interference in Afghan affairs, in the end it would still not have been possible to evade the danger that was brewing in the south of the country. In any case, large measures and large additional expenditures would be required to strengthen the defense in this direction, not to mention the threat of destabilization of the internal situation in the Central Asian republics.

- That is, if we objectively assess the situation that was developing by that time, it becomes quite obvious that the Soviet Union could not remain aloof from the events in Afghanistan and somehow had to react. Another thing - how?

- Of course, from the height of today's realities, knowing all the circumstances of the case and the intentions of the parties, it can be assumed that more promising and rational in that situation would be a persistent search for ways of political settlement of internal and external Afghan problems.

As for the use of military force, here, among other things, it must be borne in mind that the Afghan leadership about twenty times turned to the Soviet government with a request to bring in our troops. Initially, all of these requests were denied. The Soviet leadership did not consider it possible to send troops to Afghanistan, limiting itself to sending advisers, specialists to the Afghan army, supplying weapons, military equipment, fuels and lubricants and food. At a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU in March 1979, Brezhnev said: “It is necessary to explain to Taraki (Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of Afghanistan. - G.M.) and other Afghan comrades that we can help them with everything that is necessary to conduct all actions in the country. The participation of our troops in Afghanistan can harm not only us, but above all them.”

However, after the assassination of Taraki, the decision to send troops was still made. Actually, there was no calm, balanced assessment of the situation then. Much was done in a hurry. Even some members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the leaders of the allied countries under the Warsaw Pact were not informed about the decision to send troops to Afghanistan in a timely manner. Our military advisers learned about the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan from foreign radio broadcasts. There was not a sufficiently intelligible explanation of the reasons for the military intervention in our press either.

It is clear that by placing the main emphasis on the use of military force, we weakened other levers for solving the Afghan problem - political-diplomatic, economic, informational, and so on. Not to mention the fact that the protracted war in Afghanistan, the need for constant support for the Kabul regime required huge financial and material expenses, undermining the already lame economy of the USSR. However, as they say, what happened was what happened.

For more than nine years of war in Afghanistan, our troops have carried out almost 420 operations against the Mujahideen. And most of them were large-scale. More than 200 private operations and raids were also carried out to destroy opposition detachments, set up ambushes on caravan routes, reconnaissance of the enemy’s forces and means, and provide assistance to their units that were surrounded. At the same time, our soldiers and officers had to operate in the most difficult conditions, at an altitude of 2.5-4.5 thousand meters, at a temperature of plus 45-50 degrees and an acute shortage of water. Nevertheless, we didn’t defeat anyone there, and, as one Afghan song says, only later did we understand “what enemy we didn’t finish off.”

This is already a thing of the past, but, as it seems now, with more massive actions, the situation in Afghanistan could gradually normalize, and after 2-3 years a significant part of our troops could be withdrawn. It is difficult to say what the political consequences of a more massive invasion of our troops could be, but with all certainty it can be argued that the human casualties and material costs of the Afghan war would have been much less.

And one more indicative, in my opinion, moment related to this topic. When a partial mobilization was announced in the Turkestan military district and they began to prepare troops for entry into Afghanistan, one of the correspondents present in Termez asked the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army Sergei Fedorovich Akhromeev, who was there: “How justified do you think the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan ? He replied: "If we had not come to Afghanistan, the Americans would have come." I remember that some printed editions in the US and Europe literally ridiculed combat general: they say, can anyone in America come up with the idea to fight in Afghanistan? And who is there now? Americans...

As a conclusion, I would like to emphasize the particular importance of coordinating the positions of Russia and the Central Asian republics in relation to Afghanistan. The transition from a unitary union state to the Commonwealth of Independent States does not mean the disappearance of interests and values ​​common to our countries. They exist in life and will inevitably make themselves felt as an expression of the objective need for the most rational solution of common, interrelated political, economic and defense tasks. The Afghan problem has absorbed just such common interests and tasks.

And in conclusion, I want to say. In Afghanistan, honestly fulfilling their duty, warriors of many nationalities fought, they shared both the grief of loss and the joys of combat successes. By joint efforts, everything must be done to ensure that peace and tranquility come to us from Afghanistan, so that the unresolved Afghan problem does not turn into a new disaster for our peoples. We must also think about helping to restore the economy of this long-suffering country.

On the whole, the war in Afghanistan remains one of the most tragic pages in our history. At the same time, she showed the world unprecedented examples of the courage and heroism of Soviet soldiers, many of which have not yet found a worthy reflection in literature and art. It is also important to take into account as fully as possible both the political and military experience of this war, so that it serves as a proper lesson for a more reasonable solution of today's and future tasks of ensuring the security and peaceful coexistence of our peoples ...

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The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988, in accordance with the Geneva agreements concluded in April 1988 on a political settlement of the situation around the DRA. The Soviet Union undertook to withdraw its contingent within nine months, that is, before February 15 next year.
In the first three months, 50,183 troops were reported to have left Afghanistan. Another 50,100 people returned to the USSR between August 15, 1988 and February 15, 1989.
The operation to withdraw troops was constantly attacked by dushmans. According to the Washington Post newspaper, a total of 523 Soviet soldiers were killed during this period.
On February 15, 1989, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov, according to the official version, became the last Soviet soldier to cross the border between the two countries along the Friendship Bridge. In fact, both Soviet military personnel who were captured by the dushmans and units of border guards who covered the withdrawal of troops and returned to the territory of the USSR only in the afternoon of February 15 remained on the territory of Afghanistan. The border troops of the KGB of the USSR performed the tasks of protecting the Soviet-Afghan border by separate units on the territory of Afghanistan until April 1989.

In December 1979, over the bridge across the Amu Darya River, hastily formed units of the “limited contingent of Soviet troops,” as Minister of Defense D.F. slyly called the 40th Army, entered Afghanistan. Ustinov. At that time, few people understood the purpose for which the troops were going "across the river", with whom they would have to fight, and how long this "international mission" would last.
As it turned out later, the military, including marshals and generals, also did not understand, but the order to invade was carried out accurately and on time.

In February 1989, that is, more than nine years later, the caterpillars of tanks and armored vehicles rumbled across the bridge again: the army was returning back. The generals sparingly announced to the soldiers that the task of fulfilling their "international duty" was completed, it was time to go home. The politicians were silent.

Between these two dates - the abyss.

Over the abyss - a bridge that connected two eras. They went to Afghanistan at the height of the Cold War. The fulfillment of the "international duty" declared to the soldiers was nothing more than a continuation of communist expansion, part of the unshakable Kremlin doctrine, according to which we support any revolutions if they proclaim national liberation slogans, and their leaders swear allegiance to the ideals of Marxism-Leninism.

They returned back at the peak of Gorbachev's perestroika. When our leaders hypnotized both themselves and a significant part of their population, it was time for a "new thinking." When the soldiers who had carried many years of guard around the world were recalled to the barracks, the tanks were sent for melting down, the military alliance of the Warsaw Pact countries survived recent months, and many of us (if not all) believed: a life without wars and violence is coming.

It seemed to someone that this bridge leads to that future life.

In February, veterans celebrated the 25th anniversary of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan
From a time distance of a quarter of a century, much is seen differently. It’s not a fact that the truth will be revealed to us right now, but still, it’s time to reconsider some of the recently stable stereotypes about the Afghan war.

The most important and most persistent of them - about the criminal nature of that nine-year campaign - many Russian liberals continue to repeat like a mantra.

Nor do they stigmatize the even longer military presence of the Americans and their allies in Afghanistan in the same way. It's strange... After all, if we discard any ideological husk, then we and they did the same work there, namely, they fought with rabid religious extremists. They defended not so much the secular regimes in Kabul as their own national interests.

In order to objectively assess what happened then, we must recall the real situation that developed in the region by the end of the 70s.

And there was this. so-called. The "April Revolution", and in fact the coup d'état, staged in the spring of 1978 by young, left-wing officers, outstripped another rebellion, which had been preparing Islamic radical organizations for several years. Prior to this, their battle groups had mainly carried out one-time raids on the provinces of the country, but gradually this black force thickened, filled with power and became a real factor in regional politics.

At the same time, it should be recalled that Afghanistan has been an absolutely secular state for all previous decades - with a network of lyceums and universities, morals quite free by Islamic standards, cinemas, cafes and restaurants. At one time, Western hippies even chose it for their parties - that's what kind of country it was.

He was secular-Soviet, and skillfully balanced between the superpowers, receiving help from both the USSR and Western countries. "We light American cigarettes with Soviet matches," the Afghans themselves joked about this.

Now we have to admit something else: the revolution that happened greatly intensified the Mujahideen groups and their sponsors in Pakistan, who, supporting them, played their game on this field.

Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan

Forget that war like a bad dream? Did not work out
And since Moscow favorably reacted to the revolution, other, much more powerful forces automatically joined this support. Islamist uprisings broke out all over the country, and when an infantry division in Herat went over to their side in the spring of 1979, the smell of fried for real.

An almost forgotten, but very eloquent fact: then, in March 1979, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU met for three days in a row (!), Discussing the situation in Herat and considering the pleas of the Afghan leadership to provide him with immediate military assistance.

The Herat rebellion became a kind of signal for the CIA to intensify operations in the Afghan direction. American intelligence considered Afghanistan in the context of the entire situation that had developed in the region by that time. The States just then suffered a painful defeat in Iran, from where they had to leave after the overthrow of the Shah. The Khomeinists who seized power vehemently criticized the Americans. Extensive piece the globe, rich in oil and strategically important from all points of view, now remained ownerless, but could well come under the control of the Soviets - this was feared overseas.

The détente was coming to an end and was replaced by a long period of confrontation. The Cold War was nearing its peak.

When proposing to start large-scale covert operations to support the Islamists, American intelligence did not rule out the possibility that it would be able to draw the Soviets into armed struggle and thereby bleed the main enemy. If the position of the partisans grows stronger, Moscow will unwittingly have to expand its military assistance to the regime up to a direct invasion of Afghanistan, CIA analysts reasoned. This will become a trap for the Soviet Union, which will get bogged down in bloody clashes with the partisans for many years, this is the time. The future conflict will be a gift for Western propagandists who will finally have visible evidence of the perfidy of the Kremlin and its expansionist plans - that's two. And if the hostilities last for a long period, then they will certainly exhaust the USSR, and then victory in " cold war"Let's go to the Americans.

That is why the "going beyond the Amu Darya", which seemed to our generals very soon to be fleeting and easy, turned into a protracted, exhausting campaign. They fought not with a handful of rabid fanatics, but with a secret force behind which stood the colossal resources of the West, the Arab countries and even China. No other insurgency in the history of mankind has received such massive outside help.

It was easy to cross this bridge into Afghanistan. Going back is impossible.

I remember a conversation with our ambassador in Kabul F.A. Tabeev, held in the summer of 1983. Well aware of what was happening at the top, the ambassador told me: "Andropov is now in the Kremlin, and he is aware of the senselessness of our military presence in Afghanistan. Soon everything will change." But Andropov was gone, and the sick Chernenko did not get around to the war, and only with the advent of Gorbachev began the long process of finding ways to get out of the Afghan trap.

Yes, from a distance of several decades, much is now seen differently.

Declassified documents show that our leaders, not without reason, feared a radical infection from the south, which could hit the Central Asian republics. Andropov's office may have been wrong in its assessment of the internal Afghan situation, but we must give it its due in being aware of the moods inside the USSR. Alas, even then there was fertile ground for religious extremism in our southern republics.

And this means only one thing: Soviet soldiers - Russians, Ukrainians, Tatars, Tajiks, Belarusians, Estonians, everyone who was part of the 40th Army - following a combat order, guarded peace and tranquility on their land, defended the national interests of their common homeland.

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Afterword

It is with this feeling, with the awareness of this mission, that the veterans of Afghanistan are celebrating the 25th anniversary of the end of that long and bloody war.

Over the past decades, volumes of books have been written about the war and scientific research. After all, to everything else, it was a bitter, but very instructive experience. What useful lessons could be learned from that tragic epic! What mistakes to avoid! But, to our great regret, our bosses do not have the habit of learning from other people's mistakes. Otherwise, there would not have been such insane losses in Chechnya, and there would have been no war in the North Caucasus. Otherwise, long ago (and not now) we would have begun to radically rebuild our armed forces, which obviously do not meet the requirements of the times.

When on February 15, 1989, the last battalions crossed the bridge dividing the two banks, none of the top Soviet leadership met them in Termez, did not say kind words, did not remember the dead, did not promise to support the mutilated.

It seems that the fathers of perestroika and "new thinking" wanted to quickly, like a bad dream, forget that war, start the future from scratch.

Did not work out. The bridge across the Amu Darya did not at all lead to a world without wars and upheavals.

It turns out that gunpowder and now must be kept dry.

The Day of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan 2019, otherwise known as Internationalist Day, is a memorable date celebrated in Russia, symbolizing the memory of Soviet military personnel performing their tasks far from their relatives and homeland. Modern authorities do not really favor this day, because in essence the war was lost. Forces of surviving veterans erected memorial monuments throughout the country. In honor of the event, activists hold rallies and charity events, reminding the state of its obligations to the soldiers, whose lives they used to achieve their geopolitical goals.

Event History

The definition of the day when the holiday is celebrated is by no means accidental - February 15 is the date on which, according to official sources, the last Soviet soldier. Also, this date marks the end of the Afghan conflict, in which official Moscow accepted its defeat.

Interesting! “There is a legend that the last Soviet general who left the lands of Afghanistan was Boris Gromov, with his troops, which was a little later than February 15, but there is no official confirmation of this fact”

The conflict in Afghanistan was one of the bloodiest local clashes in the entire history of the Soviet Union. According to official statistics, more than 550 thousand Soviet military personnel passed through the millstones of the war, of which:

  • 72 thousand became Heroes of the Soviet Union;
  • 15 thousand - died;
  • 311 soldiers were declared missing.

According to official data, the war lasted for a long 9 years. Other sources believe that the first reconnaissance operations, with the use of firearms, began a year earlier than the confrontation acquired official status. These events in Soviet history are remembered as a period of grief, both for the soldiers involved in the conflict and for the mothers who did not reach home. Many girls were left without their loved ones, and not only because the latter died, many returned as completely different people than they left. In Soviet medicine, such a disease as post-traumatic stress disorder did not exist, the fighters were not treated, which only made them worse.

Celebration traditions

The memory of the soldiers of the internationalists in Moscow is honored by visiting the grave of the unknown soldier. In St. Petersburg, they visit the monument to St. Petersburg internationalists who died in the performance of state combat missions. People really connected with the holiday spend it visiting the Island of Courage and Sorrow, popularly called the Island of Tears. On this day, a lot of people gather on it, both participating in those events and treating them with understanding. Until today, on the island you can see failed wives and sad mothers, who have been mourning their loved ones for 30 years. How many years will not pass, and there will be people on the island for a very long time, only the degree of kinship will change, because the grieving mothers will eventually be replaced by children and grandchildren.

Important! “It is worth noting that on this day events are held not only in Russia, but also in other countries. post-Soviet space, in particular in Ukraine"

Solemn congratulations and celebrations usually include:

  • Municipal children's programs;
  • Round tables with participants in conflicts;
  • Presentation of the updated and updated "Book of Memory";
  • Open lessons dedicated to patriotism and courage;
  • Bard song concerts;
  • book exhibitions;
  • Open museum tours;
  • Sports events held under the auspices of the military.

All other Russians who do not attend social events can immerse themselves in the atmosphere of the day by watching films broadcast on the country's main TV channels that evening. Recognized classics covering that period of the life of Soviet military personnel were such films as:

  • Muslim;
  • 9 Rota;
  • Duty;
  • Dedicated to the heroes of Afghanistan ... and others.

Modern issues

Given the aggressive contemporary politics in Russia, Vladimir Putin does not often please the heroes of Afghanistan with his congratulations, and several times even offered to cancel the celebration, because a bitter defeat is not at all “befitting”, the always victorious state. So in the last interview on this topic, he only dryly stated: "assessments must be given."

For help in celebrating and with opposing initiatives, the head of the State Duma and other personalities of the Russian statehood. More than 30 years have passed since the end of these events, but the unequivocal position of the leaders of our country regarding the holiday has not yet been formed.

In memory

The Afghan warriors will forever remain in the memory of the people and in the hearts of their mourning wives, mothers and children. One can only hope that this memory will help the government to make the right decisions in the future and not send the sons of their people to obviously hopeless wars, motivated solely by the imperial ambitions of the ruling elite.

On April 7, 1988, USSR Minister of Defense Dmitry Yazov signed a directive that determined the procedure for the withdrawal of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops (OKSV) from Afghanistan and methods for ensuring security on the march. According to the document, the last unit of the army was to leave the republic on February 15, 1989.

On the same day, April 7, 1988, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Mikhail Gorbachev met in Tashkent with the President of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) Mohammad Najibullah. At the talks, the Soviet leader persuaded his Afghan colleague to conclude a political agreement with Pakistan, which supported the armed opposition.

This document was signed on April 14, 1988 in Geneva. The USSR and the USA acted as guarantors of a peaceful settlement. Islamabad took upon itself the obligation not to interfere in the affairs of the DRA, and Moscow - to withdraw troops from May 15, 1988 to February 15, 1989.

The units of the USSR army were supposed to leave Afghanistan in stages and transfer the authority to ensure security to government forces. It is generally accepted that the Geneva document provided Moscow with international legal grounds for the full completion of the Afghan campaign.

regime weakness

Since 1980, the basis of the OKSV was the 40th army, formed in the Turkestan military district in December 1979. The directive on the withdrawal of troops was prepared on the basis of proposals from the leadership of this unit. One of its developers was the commander of the 40th Army, Colonel-General Boris Gromov.

In his memoirs, he argued that the maximum stay in Afghanistan was limited to 2-3 years. This version is confirmed by many researchers. In particular, Viktor Korgun, head of the Afghanistan sector of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, believed that the negotiation process, which resulted in the Geneva agreements, was initiated in 1982 by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Yuri Andropov.

However, the discussion of specific plans for the withdrawal of the OKSV started only in 1985, and only in 1987 did Moscow make a final decision on such a painful issue.

  • Frame of the withdrawal of the Soviet contingent from Afghanistan, February 1989
  • Press Service of the Ministry of Defense

546 thousand Soviet servicemen went through the war, which lasted 10 years, and 13.8 thousand people died in it. As Gromov notes, “our losses in Afghanistan were four times less than, say, the Americans in Vietnam, but I don’t think that it is easier for the mothers, widows and children of those who died from this.”

In his book The Tragedy and Valor of Afghanistan, Major General Alexander Lyakhovsky emphasizes that the key reason for the withdrawal of the OKSV was the inability of the DRA government units to restrain the onslaught of the Mujahideen, even with tangible support from the contingent.

The weakness of the army of Najibullah was explained by the lack of motivation of the personnel, the lack of professional personnel, the inability to conduct counter-propaganda work and find a common language with local authorities. Soviet officers were constantly faced with the fact that armed forces The DRA could not take elementary measures to organize defense.

Before leaving Afghanistan, the USSR Ministry of Defense developed clear recommendations for ensuring the security of the DRA, taking into account the human and material resources possessed by government forces. However, most of the instructions were never implemented. In 1992, the regime of Najibullah collapsed, and in 1996 the Taliban* seized power in the country.

Boris Gromov also recalled that the war in Afghanistan lost its meaning due to the inability of the army and government loyal to the USSR to consolidate the outcome of military operations. According to him, the Soviet troops were forced to constantly recapture the recently liberated areas. This led to an increase in losses among personnel and an overstrain of economic resources.

“The local Afghan leadership, despite the pro-Soviet sentiments, was not interested in the fact that the fighting was carried out by us with maximum efficiency. Only a few of them in the "cleansed" counties tried to consolidate their power and lead. Obviously, they understood that sooner or later the war would end, and, apart from them, there would be no one to answer ... Instead of specific decisive actions, only beautiful speeches and talk about faith in internationalism and a bright future for the Afghan homeland were heard, ”Gromov describes the situation. .

  • Press Service of the Ministry of Defense

"International Debt"

The purpose of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in 1979 was the desire of the leadership of the USSR to secure the southern borders, consolidating the results of the pro-communist coup (the so-called April Revolution of 1978). The US and neighboring Pakistan opposed the regime change.

Formally, OKSV fulfilled "an international duty to the Afghan people building socialism." However, in general, successful international propaganda initiated by the West created the idea that the Soviet army was an occupying force that did not take into account the interests of the inhabitants of the republic.

Among the local population of the DRA, Pakistani and American intelligence spread slogans about the fight against "infidels", playing on Islamist sentiments. As a result, a fairly powerful partisan movement arose in Afghanistan, which kept the rear units of the OKSV in suspense.

“The Afghans warmly welcomed our first columns. Communication between Soviet Tajiks and Uzbeks with the local population began everywhere. However, already at the end of the month (January 1980), the clouds began to thicken. One of the reasons for this was active anti-Soviet propaganda. In every village and small town people were turned against us,” Gromov stated.

In addition, the participants in the battles recall that huge difficulties arose with the supply of troops. The mountainous and rocky terrain did not always allow the delivery of goods by land transport, and helicopters could not drop cargo from a height of more than 2 km. In addition, rotorcraft have become a vulnerable target with the appearance of American MANPADS among the Mujahideen.

Escorting the columns required colossal efforts. To ensure their safe passage, the Soviet troops had to organize outposts in the highlands. Climbing to a height of over three thousand meters was a very difficult test. The servicemen simply physically could not deliver the required amount of ammunition and ammunition to the summit.

“Each soldier, sergeant and officer went to the mountains, carrying 40-60 kg on his shoulders. With such a huge weight, and even under the scorching sun, not everyone can just climb to the top, let alone take the fight after that. Therefore, commanders sometimes looked, as they say, through their fingers at the fact that some soldiers left heavy equipment in the barracks before going out into the mountains - bulletproof vests and helmets, ”explains Gromov.

  • Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan
  • Press Service of the Ministry of Defense

Helicopter pilots also took a big risk. As a rule, the car rested with the front chassis against a small ledge, indicated a hang and dumped the load on the rocks. However, after completing the mission, the helicopter could not climb up. The car actually fell down, and then gained speed and lift. It was the only way to deliver goods to the highlands.

Problems with transport deprived the Soviet troops of the opportunity to organize a normal evacuation of the wounded. Most often, the unit commander chose the most hardy soldiers who carried their comrade on a makeshift stretcher. They were accompanied by a group of guards. 13-15 people could be involved in the evacuation of one wounded man.

“We literally bit into the mountains”

The Mujahideen and Pakistani special forces, who knew the surrounding area perfectly, took advantage of the problems experienced by the Soviet contingent. For example, remote outposts that covered the movement of columns were subjected to regular attacks from superior enemy forces.

The most famous episode illustrating the fierce clashes that took place in the highlands occurred on January 7, 1988. The paratroopers of the 9th company defending height 3234 were attacked by 300 dushmans. In the famous film by Fyodor Bondarchuk, all the soldiers of the unit died (only one conscript was an exception). In fact, the loss of the garrison amounted to 6 out of 39 people.

The height defenders showed professionalism and military prowess (two fighters were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously). However, the paratroopers could not hold out without reinforcements and artillery support. In reality, the positions of the Mujahideen were constantly hit by Soviet howitzers and jet systems salvo fire.

The history of the feat of the 9th company demonstrates high level the combat capability of Soviet military personnel operating in the most difficult natural and climatic conditions. The command and fighters of the OKSV quickly enough learned how to competently organize defense in order to prevent the blockade of the held heights by the enemy.

“It was very difficult to “burrow” into the rocks. Still, they found rather original solutions that made it possible to protect the site entrusted to a platoon or company without leaving the outpost at all. We literally bit into the mountains, making full-length trenches. Having run through these passages and passages from the barracks, the soldier found himself in his firing position, never showing himself to the enemy, ”Gromov says about one of the original ways of organizing defense in the mountains.

  • Monument to Soviet soldiers in the mountains of Afghanistan
  • Press Service of the Ministry of Defense

Hunlost war

Expert of the Center for the Study of Modern Afghanistan Dmitry Verkhoturov believes that soviet soldiers successfully completed the assigned tasks in the DRA. According to him, many facts refute the widespread opinion in the West that the OKSV allegedly left Afghanistan in defeat.

“The Mujahideen, in fact, failed to do anything against the Soviet troops, the militants had success only in battles with government forces. Therefore, there is no reason to conclude that Moscow lost that war. At the same time, it makes sense to discuss whether the Soviet troops should have been so deeply involved in the conflict and what political mistakes were made, ”Verkhoturov said in an interview with RT.

As the expert explained, the initial mission of the OKSV was to occupy strategically important facilities to support the Najibullah regime. Conducting large-scale hostilities was the prerogative of government forces. The strategy changed in 1982, when Moscow realized that in order to maintain the socialist orientation of Afghanistan, it was necessary to become a full-fledged participant in the war.

“It is worth dispelling another myth - there was no occupation of Afghanistan. Government troops and officials acted quite autonomously from their Soviet patrons. True, in my opinion, this was the main mistake of the USSR. The leadership of the DRA did not have the resources to govern the country. In order to preserve the regime, a real occupation was required on the principle of the one that was in East Germany in 1945-1949, ”Verkhoturov said.

  • Soviet troops on armored vehicles leave Afghanistan
  • Press Service of the Ministry of Defense

The interlocutor of RT is convinced that only more decisive actions by the USSR could be the key to maintaining a stable Afghanistan. According to Verkhoturov, Moscow should have used ten years in the DRA in a different way - to focus its efforts on educating the military and political elite, which then could keep power in its hands.

“How could our allies manage the army if a significant part of the officers were illiterate, and politicians and officials loyal to the USSR had no idea how to develop the country. Moscow did not manage to do much, but it came to Afghanistan with good intentions. To understand this, it is enough to compare the period of 1979-1989 with the consequences of the stay of the American contingent in the country since 2001,” Verkhoturov summed up.

Withdrawal of a limited contingent. However, in April 1985, the political leadership of the USSR proclaimed a policy of renunciation of the use of force in international relations and without proper preparation began to take measures to reduce the combat strength of the OKSV. So, by September 20, 1986, six regiments were redeployed from Afghanistan to the territory of the USSR.

In turn, the Afghan leadership (since May 1986 it was headed by Najibullah) developed and in 1987 proposed to the opposition a policy of national reconciliation. However, the opposition leaders did not accept it and continued the "war to the bitter end." Nevertheless, the position of official Kabul gave a new impetus to the negotiations on an Afghan settlement that had been held since 1982 in Geneva.

The Geneva agreements on a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan were signed on April 14, and entered into force on May 15, 1988. A quadripartite agreement was reached on the timing and schedule for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan within 9 months. Patriotic military history in 3 volumes - M .: Institute military history MO RF, 2003, p. 533.

The Geneva agreements were fully implemented by the Soviet side: by August 15, 1988, the number of OKSV was reduced by 50%, and on February 15, 1989, the last Soviet unit left Afghan territory.

But, as mentioned above, after the withdrawal of troops Soviet army, the Border Troops of the KGB of the USSR remained on the territory of Afghanistan. Official - for transfer material assets the Afghan side, but in fact they guarded the rear of the Afghan government troops. And they were in Afghanistan until July 1991. Two and a half years longer than the Soviet Army. And for these two and a half years, the border guards have not lost a single person. Gribanov B. I. On both sides of the border / Gribanov B. I. - M .: "Border", 1999, p. 17

The Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR in December 1989 condemned political decision on the introduction of troops into Afghanistan, recognizing it from a legal point of view as illegal, and from a moral point of view - immoral. Patriotic military history in 3 volumes - M .: Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2003, p. 535.

But nonetheless. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the Afghan opposition was opposed only by the government Armed Forces, which had noticeably strengthened over the years of their stay in the country of the OKSV and to which the USSR continued to supply weapons and equipment. Four automobile columns were formed, 100 KamAZ vehicles each, and an "air bridge" Tashkent - Kabul was organized by military transport aviation USSR Air Force. Over a thousand Soviet military advisers also worked in Afghanistan. General of the Army M.A. Gareev led the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in the DRA. Initially, the Afghan government military successfully fought the opposition. In the spring of 1989, a large-scale offensive launched by the combined forces of the Afghan opposition with the support of Pakistani military units in the area of ​​the city of Jalalabad was repulsed, most likely with the help of Soviet air force strikes. We see that, in general, so far nothing fatal has happened after the withdrawal of OKSV. In 1990, there was even a decline in the intensity of hostilities. Government troops repelled all attacks by opposition detachments, successfully restrained them in various parts of the country. The Afghan opposition did not have enough strength to overthrow the PDPA and seize power in the country. There was a kind of stalemate. It made a political settlement of the Afghan problem a reality. And in this situation, the leadership of the USSR, headed by M. S. Gorbachev, makes decisions that led to disaster. In July 1991, Soviet border guards left Afghanistan, and in October 1991, the leadership of the USSR decided to stop military assistance to the Afghan government from January 1, 1992, which led to a sharp weakening ruling regime and predetermined his downfall.

It must be said that the leadership of the DRA did not use positive moments either, the struggle for power intensified in it. The lack of unity in the highest echelons of government increased the oppositional moods of some of the officers against Najibullah and his entourage, contributed to an increase in the desertion of military personnel from the ranks of the armed forces, as well as the transition of some units to the side of the enemy. Patriotic military history in 3 volumes - M .: Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2003, p. 534. However, even here the fault of the USSR leadership, which recalled military advisers and General M.A. split in the leadership of the DRA. Thus, the opportunity was missed to establish a peaceful life in Afghanistan, to prevent it from becoming a breeding ground for terrorism and drug trafficking.

On April 28, 1992, opposition parties came to power in the country. Patriotic military history in 3 volumes - M .: Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2003, p. 535. A provisional government was formed and the Islamic State of Afghanistan was proclaimed. However, the conflict did not end there. It developed into an armed struggle between the military-political groups of the opposition, as a result of which the Taliban came to power. After the terrorist act in the USA on September 11, 2001 and the subsequent international anti-terrorist operation on the territory of Afghanistan, the Taliban were removed from power, but peace did not come on the Afghan territory. However, this is a completely different story.

Comparison. Many Western military experts, analysts, political scientists, politicians and generals note that the USSR fought and acted in Afghanistan much more successfully than the US and NATO. And if after the departure of the Soviet troops the pro-Soviet government lasted three years, then after the departure of the US and NATO troops, the Karzai government will not last even three months. But it must be borne in mind that the DRA government fell after the cessation of assistance and support from the USSR, and then the Russian Federation. Thus, the prerequisites for solving the Afghan problem were created, but because of the "perestroika" they were missed and the Afghan crisis has no end in sight. And the possibilities to settle it are now much more vague than in the early 1990s. And many in the West are increasingly calling for the use of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan.

During the war years, according to various sources, from 620,000 to 3,000,000 Soviet military personnel served in the OKSV. But often there is a figure - more than 1,000,000. And all participants in the war believe that much more than 620,000 passed through it. For example, the opinion of Colonel of the Airborne Forces Yu. M. Lapshin: "More than 800 thousand of our compatriots passed through that land." Lapshin Yu. M. Afghan diary / Lapshin Yu. M. - M .: OLMA-PRESS, 2004, p. 354 Also, 21,000 civilian personnel went through the war.

Losses of the USSR.

When to the oases of Jalalabad,

Having fallen on the wing of the "tulip", ours fell,

We cursed all our work

Again the soldier let down the loss of the company.

In Shindand, in Kandahar and in Bagram,

Again put a heavy stone on the soul,

Again carry heroes to the homeland,

Whom at the age of twenty they dig graves ...

The number of dead.

The total irretrievable human losses of the Soviet Armed Forces amounted to 14,453 people. In Afghanistan, 417 servicemen were captured and went missing, of which 119 people were released from captivity, 97 returned home by 2004. Thus, 201 people are still missing. 18 people were interned in other countries, these are traitors who asked for political asylum in Western countries.

Sanitary losses amounted to 469,685 people, including: 53,753 people were wounded, shell-shocked and injured, 6,669 people became disabled (11.44%); 415.932 people fell ill (88.56%).

There is an opinion that the given data on the dead is significantly underestimated. official statistics(the figure is called 50.000). However, there is no convincing evidence for this.

The war cost the Soviet Union about 70-80 billion dollars.

As for the losses in technology, they are as follows:

109 aircraft;

322 helicopters;

147 tanks;

1.314 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers;

432 guns and mortars;

11.370 cars. Classified removed: Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, hostilities and military conflicts: Statistical study/ under total ed. Krivosheeva G. F. M.: 1993, S. 402-406.

It is immediately clear that the main targets of the attack were trucks moving in columns.

For courage and heroism shown during the period of hostilities in Afghanistan, 86 servicemen from the OKSV were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (28 people posthumously). 202,000 thousand servicemen were awarded other orders and medals of the USSR (10,900 of them posthumously), including: 103 - the Order of Lenin, 972 - the Order of the Red Banner of Battle and 52,520 - the Order of the Red Star. Okorokov A. Secret Wars Soviet Union - M .: "Yauza", 2008, S. 210.

Losses in Afghanistan. The losses of the dushmans were monstrous. Often they talk about 1,000,000 destroyed dushmans. And this is the minimum. The calculations were carried out on the basis of the count of those destroyed on the battlefield, on the basis of undercover intelligence, radio and military intelligence. And the calculations were done very carefully. In fact, contrary to the opinion of many journalists and historians, the Soviet Armed Forces were severely punished for postscripts and fraud. Data for 1981. According to the most modest data of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR for 1981, not the most successful year for the Soviet Army, over 20,000 dushmans were destroyed, 60,000-80,000 were wounded, 8,000 were taken prisoner. Afghanistan - http:/ /www.rusproject.org. And every year the losses of dushmans increased. Among the destroyed dushmans were not only Afghans, but also many foreign mercenaries and instructors (Saudi, Egyptians, Syrians, Jordanians, Iranians, Pakistanis, Uighurs, Algerians, Germans, British, Americans and many others). Afghanistan - http:/ /www.rusproject.org. Hundreds if not thousands of Pakistani soldiers and officers and dozens of Iranian soldiers and officers also died in battles with Soviet troops.

Of course, unfortunately, many Afghan civilians also died.

Thus, the losses of Afghanistan amounted to 1.500.000 Afghanistan - http:/ /www.rusproject.org. up to 2.500.000 people. Lyakhovsky A. The tragedy and valor of Afghanistan / Lyakhovsky A. - M.: Eksmo, 2009, p. 1018.

Comparison. The actions of the Soviet and American armies have already been compared above. The Soviet Army operated more effectively in Vietnam and Afghanistan than the American Army in Afghanistan and Vietnam. If the US left Vietnam because of defeat, then the USSR left Afghanistan for political reasons. Yes, in general, the Soviet and Russian Armed Forces operated in Western Ukraine, Lithuania, Korea, Vietnam, Egypt, Syria, Hungary, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Damansky, Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Yugoslavia, Georgia, much more effectively than the vaunted US Army and Navy in Korea, Vietnam, Panama, Grenada, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq. As for the actions of US troops in Afghanistan, it is worth saying here that the US troops are in great demand Russian technology especially helicopters. And such a moment. When US troops entered Afghanistan, long time they didn't get anything. And only after the American side turned to Russia for help and consulted with representatives of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation that took part in the Soviet-Afghan war, the Pentagon received schemes for the protection and defense of locations developed by our officers during the Soviet-Afghan war, the situation was corrected in better side. This moment testifies to the high professionalism of our Armed Forces.

The significance of the war was that the USSR did not allow other countries in the region to strengthen, helped the allies, helped the Afghan people create an economy, education and healthcare system, and ensured the security of their borders. Enormous combat experience has been gained in the war on terrorism. And, who knows, if it were not for "perestroika", then Afghanistan would now live and develop in peace, and there would be no threat of terrorism that exists now. It was the USSR that first encountered the forces of international terrorism and destroyed a huge number of terrorists. But history does not tolerate the subjunctive mood.

The main task of the Afghan Islamic opposition, Pakistan, Iran and the CIA was to transfer the war to the territory of the USSR. But this task was not realized, thanks to the successful actions of the Soviet Army and the KGB of the USSR. Afghanistan - http://www.rusproject.org

Since 1985, a long-planned "drug war" began against the USSR. The "opium war" against the USSR was joined by large international networks of drug dealers, who acted under the control of the special services of the anti-Soviet coalition. Foreign agents penetrated into the USSR through the mountainous regions of Tajikistan under the guise of hunters, shepherds, gold miners and small traders, its first task was to form an agent network of persons "offended" Soviet power, primarily convicted or drug addicts and religious fanatics. But these efforts were frustrated by the efforts of the KGB of the USSR. In the second half of the 80s, Soviet counterintelligence thwarted a major operation - Project M. The objective of the project was to spread Islamic ideology on the territory of the USSR, in particular - extremist forms, the creation of an anti-Soviet underground, carrying out sabotage and terrorist acts. Afghanistan - http://www.rusproject.org

For 2 years, only in containers with cargo from Afghanistan, following in transit through the USSR to Europe, the KGB of the USSR seized more than 10 tons of hashish, 68 drug carriers were identified under the guise of passengers, more than 50 attempts were stopped by smugglers-drug dealers. Afghanistan - http://www.rusproject.org

The United States spent huge amounts of money on the "opium war", but it did not bring success. Narcotization of Central Asia with hard drugs failed. But then the withdrawal of our troops arrived in time, the surrender of the allied government and Gorbachev's, and then Yeltsin's reshuffles in the leadership of the army and special services.

The consequences of the war are sad. With the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the continuation of the war in Afghanistan, and then the establishment of the power of the Taliban, a massive penetration of foreign agents and an onslaught of terrorism began, and wars and conflicts began in Central Asia. International terrorism has intensified. Many countries, including Russia, have experienced the strength of his actions. The same Afghan and Arab terrorists appeared in Chechnya and there were thousands of them. Chechen terrorists were trained in camps on the territory of Afghanistan. In Central Asia already Russian soldiers held back the onslaught of terrorists and Islamists.

Remember the terrible July 1993, when the terrorists (including the notorious Khattab) killed the 12th outpost in Tajikistan, and well-armed hordes of spooks and terrorists were preparing to pour deep into the valleys? They were looking for tens of thousands of Russian slaves and female slaves for drug plantations, a springboard for an onslaught in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, to reach the southern borders of present-day Russia.

The 186th Assault Aviation Regiment was then transferred from the Moscow Military District to Tajikistan. Russian aces walked through the dushmans with a steel broom, daily bringing down up to eighty tons of bombs and missiles on them. And stopped the onslaught of the enemy.

And when those who criticize the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, it would be good if they thought about where it is better to beat the enemy: on their territory, suffering heavy losses, when schools and hospitals are seized by gangs of scum and religious fanatics, seeing Budennovsk on their land, "Nord-Ost" and Beslan, two Chechen and Dagestan wars, a war in Tajikistan? Or smash the scoundrels in their lair, on their land, incurring minimal losses and preventing other countries from strengthening? I think the answer is obvious.

Or such an example. Activity Border Troops RF in Tajikistan for 1992-2005 characterized by the following data:

destroyed militants and terrorists - 3,000;

captured - 3,000 militants and terrorists;

weapons seized - 1.003 units;

ammunition - 447,000 units;

destroyed - 335 caches with weapons and ammunition;

detained and destroyed - 30.102 kg of drugs, of which 11.463 kg of heroin.

535 combat clashes, 1,378 shelling of outposts and outfits, 1,606 attempts to break through were prevented.

161 people died, 362 wounded Russian border guards.

16 border guards - Heroes of Russia (8 posthumously). Group of Border Troops of the Russian Federation in Tajikistan in 1992-2005. - http://www.wikipedia.org

And how many people die a year in the Russian Federation from Afghan drugs? Only according to official data - 28,000 per year, 2 times more than died, for 11.5 years of the Afghan war. But the Soviet troops carried out regular raids to destroy drug plantations.

How many times have I heard the reasoning of our servicemen, who bitterly noted that those against whom they fought “across the river” came to Russia and that infection called “drugs” flooded Russia.

The consequences of the war for Afghanistan are also sad. Contrary to the myth that the country turned into ruins during the stay of the Soviet troops there, the country had industry, infrastructure, schools, hospitals. The country turned into ruins after the departure of the troops, when everything was destroyed by dushmans, who began to sort things out among themselves. For example, G. Hekmatyar, in 1992, fired at American missiles Kabul, until he was guaranteed the post of prime minister. At least 2,000 civilians died then.

As a result of many years of war, Afghanistan actually lies in ruins, and its population is in poverty. Particular damage was caused to the country as a result of the fighting between the Afghans, as well as the massive missile and bomb strikes inflicted by the Americans during Operation Indomitable Freedom. What this policy will lead to, only time will tell. One thing is clear that this is a very dangerous path. And many Afghans longingly recall the time when Soviet troops were in the country. When everything worked, when there was food and much more ...

What's next for Afghanistan? A terrorist economy based on drug production and drug trafficking has been created in the country, serving as an instrument of blackmail and pressure on other countries. The future of Afghanistan is uncertain, the war has no end in sight.

One can only regret what opportunities for resolving the situation in Afghanistan were missed in the late 1980s and early 1990s.