Methods of guerrilla warfare: Diversion. Partisans of the Great Patriotic War. The use of territorial troops in counter-sabotage combat Tactics of actions of sabotage reconnaissance groups

Education

Ground attack forces (special operations forces (SOF) are designed to solve specific tasks in the interests of achieving political, economic and military goals. The United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan have sabotage and reconnaissance forces , China, Japan, South Korea and other states.
DRF includes sabotage and reconnaissance groups (DRG) and landings special purpose(DSN), created on the basis of regular reconnaissance and sabotage detachments (RDO) of the enemy's special operations forces.

RDO, designed for search and assault operations in the RD RD, has the following strength:
§ from the US Armed Forces SN group - 14 people;
§ from the regiment of the SN Armed Forces of Great Britain - 16 people;
§ from a separate reconnaissance and sabotage regiment of the French Armed Forces - 12 people.

Each RDO consists of a commander, his deputy and two identical squads, which are staffed by scouts-saboteurs. In combat use as a DRG, each RDO can operate both in full force and can be divided into two groups.

An LTO may include up to two to four RDOs. The staffing of the DSN by units is not excluded airborne troops. The composition of the DRG-6-10 people, DSN-20-60 people.

With regular forces and means, the SN group can:
§ perform tasks as part of the MTR or independently;
§ manage regular and attached units;
§ to organize an operational base for special forces;
§ deploy up to 3 forward operating bases;
§ carry out the transfer of operational detachments to the rear of the enemy, as well as organize its exit to the location of its troops by land and air;
§ news fighting on the territory occupied by the enemy for a long time with minimal external logistic support;
§ to create, equip, arm formations from the local population for conducting partisan operations, as well as to carry out their combat training;
§ perform combat missions to a depth of 3,000 km.

United States Special Operations Forces.

Rangers Battalion

The US Army has three Rangers battalions: "black berets" - in regular troops and two separate companies- in the National Guard. The Rangers battalions were administratively organized into the 75th Rangers Infantry Regiment.

The "Rangers" battalion is designed to independently carry out individual reconnaissance and sabotage tasks, conduct assault and raid operations behind enemy lines to a depth of 500 km.

The main tasks of the battalion "Rangers":
§ carrying out raids to disable key facilities and destroy the enemy's nuclear attack weapons (NSA) in its operational-tactical depth;
§ setting up ambushes;
§ seizure of important samples of weapons and military equipment;
§ violation of communication lines;
§ disorganization of the control and communications system, prohibition of the advancing of the second echelons (reserves) of the enemy;
§ obtaining intelligence.

On the basis of the battalion, 10-30 sabotage and assault detachments of the "R" type, each numbering 20-60 people, can be formed. In total, 50-150 sabotage and assault detachments of the "R" type can be created as part of the joint command of the SOF.

Special Forces "Delta"

The Delta Special Forces Detachment is operationally subordinate to the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces. The main purpose of the detachment is to free hostages, fight terrorist groups, kidnap or kill prominent political, government and military figures, seize (evacuate) samples of weapons, military equipment and documents, and perform other sabotage and reconnaissance tasks. The number of personnel of the detachment is about 300 people.

The task force is the main combat unit of the Delta squad. He is armed with the most modern weapons and military equipment (small satellite communication stations, telescopic sniper rifles), as well as poisons, drugs, etc. To carry out combat missions, the "delta" detachment is capable of deploying 18-20 operational detachments of the "D" type, numbering 16 people each.

Deep reconnaissance company

Deep reconnaissance company - special unit military intelligence. Its units are designed to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage activities behind enemy lines.
The main tasks of deep reconnaissance patrols:

§ covert penetration into the location of enemy troops for the purpose of reconnaissance and a report to the command on the deployment of enemy units and formations and the nature of their activities;
§ determining the location of delivery vehicles for nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, warehouses nuclear weapons, command posts and other important objects behind enemy lines;
§ assessment of damage inflicted on the enemy, including as a result of the use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons;
§ selection of areas suitable for airborne and airmobile operations;
§ determination of the coordinates of targets for delivering targeted air and rocket-artillery strikes against them.

British Special Operations Forces.

The reconnaissance and sabotage units of the British ground forces are combined into the SAS service. The headquarters of the service is in Chelsea (a suburb of London). A special forces group and a battalion were put into service army aviation ST. A squadron of aircraft and helicopters for special purposes of the Air Force is under operational control.

The combat use of SN operational detachments behind enemy lines, according to the views of the British command, allows solving the following tasks:

§ reconnaissance (obtaining information about the enemy, determining the coordinates of targets, calling fire and correcting it);
§ sabotage (disabling enemy facilities, kidnappings and murders, the use of weapons of mass destruction, etc.);
§ special (ensuring the internal security of a foreign state);
§ psychological (ideological sabotage, terror, propaganda, blackmail);
§ anti-terrorist (liberation of hostages, determination of the vulnerability of national facilities, etc.);
§ organizational (delivery to the rear, recruitment, creation of underground organizations and agent networks).

The detachments are armed with 7.62 mm rifles, 9 mm submachine guns, 7.62 mm machine guns, grenades and high powered mines. The detachments have communications and electronic intelligence equipment, and other special equipment.

The special purpose regiment is capable of forming 24-26 reconnaissance and sabotage detachments of 8-16 people each, and in total 72-144 formations of the indicated number can be created by M2.
Special Operations Forces of the German Armed Forces.

To conduct reconnaissance and subversive activities in the tactical and operational depths of the enemy, the German ground forces have subdivisions of deep reconnaissance. They are used for reconnaissance of nuclear weapons, concentration of troops, command posts, artillery firing positions, for target designation in the interests of nuclear missiles and aviation, as well as for organizing and carrying out sabotage behind enemy lines.

To solve these problems, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd army corps of the SV have separate companies (respectively 100, 200 and 300th) of deep reconnaissance, as well as reconnaissance companies (800th and 850th) of the territorial commands "North" and "South".

The total number of detachments that the Bundeswehr command is capable of deploying by the start of the war can be about 250-270, of which 100 reconnaissance and sabotage detachments, 50 sabotage and assault detachments.

Special Operations Forces of the French Armed Forces.

In the ground forces of France, for reconnaissance and sabotage behind enemy lines, it is planned to use operational detachments formed on the basis of the 11th separate reconnaissance and sabotage regiment and the 13th separate deep reconnaissance regiment (each with 1000 people), 3rd and 5th th separate regiments, as well as the 13th demi-brigade of the foreign legion. The number of personnel of the 3rd regiment - 900 people, the 5th regiment - 1200 people, the 13th semi-brigade - 1600 people.

These units can be compared with counterparts of the US Special Operations Forces; reconnaissance and sabotage regiment - with a special forces group, parts of the foreign legion - with Rangers battalions, the 13th separate deep reconnaissance regiment, consisting of companies - with American deep reconnaissance companies. The deep reconnaissance regiment can deploy up to 90 reconnaissance and sabotage detachments of 5 people each. On the basis of units of a foreign legion, 40 sabotage and assault detachments of about 30 people each can be created, and on the basis of a reconnaissance and sabotage regiment - up to 50 detachments of 12 people each.

By the beginning of the war, France can deploy about 260 detachments in Europe. They will operate on land theaters.

To conduct assault operations in the rear in order to destroy (destroy) large area objects of the enemy, the command of the armed forces of France can use 4 separate parachute regiments (1500 people each), each of which is capable of forming 10-15 air assault units of 100 -150 people.

Thus, France can conduct combat operations behind enemy lines in the European theater of war with the forces of 350-370 reconnaissance-sabotage and sabotage-assault detachments.

Special Operations Forces of the Spanish Armed Forces.

The Spanish ground forces have 20 special-purpose companies, 2 of which are separate and can be used at the operational depth of the theater to perform the most critical and complex reconnaissance and sabotage tasks. The personnel of the remaining 18 companies are trained under the commando program and are intended for operations in detachments of 5 people to a depth of 100 km, i.e. to conduct deep reconnaissance in the interests of individual territorial defense infantry brigades, in which they are located (each brigade has 2 companies of SN).
By the beginning of the war, 12 reconnaissance and sabotage detachments of 12-14 people each and about 160 operational groups of 5 people each can be formed in the Spanish Armed Forces.
Special Operations Forces of the Greek Armed Forces.

In order to coordinate reconnaissance and sabotage operations throughout the country, the military-political leadership of Greece, within the framework of the main headquarters of the ground forces, created a department of special operations forces.

In total, 50 reconnaissance and sabotage detachments, 30 air assault detachments can be created in the Greek Armed Forces.

Special Operations Forces of the Turkish Armed Forces.

Currently, formations, units and subunits of special forces are part of the SV, Navy and gendarmerie troops of Turkey.

In the ground forces of Turkey, for carrying out reconnaissance and sabotage activities behind enemy lines, it is planned to use separate airborne brigades (Kayseri) and 2 commando brigade, which are part of the 4th Army Corps, the 1st commando brigade (Hakkeri) and 2 -th separate regiment "commandos" (Siversk) of the 7th army corps; 1st and 2nd separate brigades"commandos" were formed as part of the ground forces of Turkey and are designed to solve sabotage and reconnaissance tasks behind enemy lines.

On the basis of the brigade, about 50 reconnaissance and sabotage detachments of 12-14 people each with a depth of deployment to the rear of up to 250 km can be formed, and on the basis of companies - 24 detachments of up to 5 people each.

Turkey's mobilization capabilities make it possible to form 200 reconnaissance and sabotage detachments for operations on enemy territory.

Special Operations Forces of the Iranian Armed Forces.

In the Iranian ground forces, special operations forces include the airborne brigades of the 23rd airborne division of the SN, which are designed to perform sabotage and reconnaissance missions in the Transcaucasian and Turkestan directions. The number of personnel of the brigade is about 4000 people, mostly non-commissioned officers and officers.

Team A (the main tactical unit for the implementation of special tasks) consists of 12 sections, each of which has 12 non-commissioned officers and officers. Team B includes 4 sections of 12 people each, designed for operations in the mountains. Team C consists of 2 sections of 12 people each and is designed to ensure the tasks of sections of teams A and B.

Special Operations Forces of the Israeli Armed Forces.

For special operations, the following special forces of the Israeli Armed Forces are used:
§ 268, 424, 483, 484th separate reconnaissance and sabotage commando battalions stationed in Shuufat, Ein Yahav, Nazareth and Tel Aviv, respectively;
§ reconnaissance and sabotage battalion of the Navy (location - Atlit);
§ special formation for the fight against terrorists "Sarayet-Mashkal".

In total, 300 reconnaissance and sabotage groups are allocated from the commando battalion as part of the squad.

Special Operations Forces of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces.

The special forces of the Republic of Korea are intended to be used on the territory of the DPRK for the purpose of conducting extensive sabotage and reconnaissance operations, terrorist acts, organizing a guerrilla (insurgent) movement, and demoralizing the population and troops.
In service with the special forces are weapon, mines and other explosive weapons, loudspeakers, searchlights, cars, light aircraft and helicopters. The total number of SN troops is more than 6,000 people. Organizationally, they are included in the command of special combat operations.

In the airborne brigade - 1160 people, 930 rifles (M16) and pistols, 230 machine guns, 145 radio stations and other special equipment and weapons.

Special Operations Forces of the Japanese Armed Forces.

Special forces units of the ground forces of Japan are designed to carry out sabotage, reconnaissance, terrorist and other types of subversive actions on the territory or behind enemy lines, including the organization of an insurrectionary and guerrilla movement. In addition, they can be involved in the course of air and sea landing operations, as well as to fight against enemy sabotage groups in the rear of their troops.

The main tasks of special forces units:

§ conducting reconnaissance of important objects behind enemy lines, primarily missile launcher launch sites, airfields, headquarters and command posts, warehouses and ammunition supply points;
§ commission of sabotage at the identified objects of the control and communications system, bridges, tunnels and other important objects;
§ organizing, equipping, training and directing the actions of insurgent and partisan detachments.

In peacetime, the basis of the special forces contingent in the Japanese Army consists of a company of rangers of the 1st mixed brigade, platoons (freelance) rangers in reconnaissance companies of infantry divisions and airborne companies of the airborne brigade, squads (freelance) rangers in infantry companies of infantry divisions. The total number of personnel of the ranger company is up to 130 people.

AT war time The Japanese command provides for the formation of new units and subunits of special forces: in each of the 5 armies - a battalion of rangers (similar to the battalions of the US Army Corps), and in each infantry division of a mixed and airborne brigades - a company of rangers.

In total, in the NE of Japan in wartime, out of 5 battalions and 26 ranger companies, up to 215 DRGs of 20 people each can be allocated.

This composition of the special operations forces does not include units of combat swimmers.

On average, sabotage and reconnaissance formations consist of 12-14 people, with the exception of France, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Greece, where their number is 5-8 people.

WEAPONS DRF.

Armament of the SN group:
§ 5.56 mm rifles - 1439 pieces;
§ M 203-108 grenade launchers;
§ 90 mm grenade launchers - 13 pcs;
§ pistols - 43 pieces;
§ set for demolition work - 383 pieces;
§ cars - 91 units;
§ light helicopters - 4 pcs;
§ aircraft - 2 pcs;
§ parachutes - 2236 pieces;
§ radio stations - 408 units;
§ small-sized nuclear mines M 129, M 159 (capacity 0.02 and 0.05 kt, weight 27 kg);
§ chemical, biological munitions, poisons, drugs, portable electronic warfare equipment.
§ The following MVS may be in service with one DRG of 6-10 people:
§ 1-2 shaped charges for the destruction of stationary objects;
§ 3-4 multi-purpose mines for selective destruction of RK units and vehicles in motion;
§ 3-4 magnetic mines for the destruction of equipment during their hidden installation;
§ 4-6 anti-personnel fragmentation mines to destroy personnel of security and defense units;
§ 1-2 portable demining charges for making a passage in the minefield of the BSP barrage system.

When performing assigned tasks, reconnaissance saboteurs can have ATGM launchers with a firing range of up to 1 - 4 km. The DRF can operate on captured combat vehicles and use captured weapons. The specific composition of weapons and equipment will depend on the degree of tasks to be solved.

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The main method of striking for the RDG was sabotage on enemy communications, military and industrial facilities. In carrying out these operations, heavy charges and a wide variety of mine devices were used - from miniature magnetic mines to large land mines. During the four years of the war, the conditions for carrying out sabotage operations changed, especially on railways and highways. The enemy security system became more and more complex and sophisticated. railway stations and paths on hauls. If in 1941-1942. Since the business was limited, as a rule, to patrolling (usually three paired patrols for each kilometer of the way), then from the summer of 1942, policemen (up to 10 people) began to be allocated to help these patrols. In 1943–1944 the system of road protection has reached the maximum saturation with military force and equipment, means of detecting and destroying reconnaissance saboteurs, laid mines by them. Patrolling on strategically important roads was supplemented by the installation of guard towers equipped with searchlights and machine guns, firing points. The Germans created open spaces, for which they cut down forests for 200–300 meters on both sides of the track, installed booby traps, noise devices, wire barriers on the approaches to the tracks.

Railway bridges were most carefully guarded. Each of the large bridges was a real defensive line with barbed wire, minefields, systems of towers with machine guns, pillboxes, searchlights, rocket alarms. At certain intervals, armored trains passed along the highways, firing at the forest approaches to the roads. Well-trained guard dogs were widely used. In an effort to divert explosions from locomotives and wagons, the Germans launched empty platforms in front of the echelons. On especially dangerous sections of the road, traffic slowed down, and on some it was allowed only during the day and only after a thorough inspection of the corresponding section of the road in order to search for mines. The most serious danger for the saboteurs was enemy ambushes, waiting for them on the outskirts of the highways and on the escape routes. They could be expected on any part of the route. But the reconnaissance bombers each time had to make a long way from base camp to the place of sabotage. Overcoming thickets and windbreaks, swamps and open spaces of 30-40 km, and in some cases up to 100 km (when the target task was to carry out sabotage in a particularly remote section of the highway), despite any obstacles, the saboteurs still carried out their tasks.

The tactics of saboteurs on the railroad were usually as follows. The demolition group almost always operated under the guise of a security subgroup. Approaching the road, the group lay within sight of the railway track, studied the situation, conducted observation, and chose the place of approach to the track. Sometimes it lasted several days. The installation of each mine required genuine skill, the utmost effort and attention. Of particular danger was the installation of non-recoverable mines that could be triggered by any vibration of the soil. The camouflage of mines also required great skill. There should not have been any traces left at the place of their installation. It was impossible to mix the dry upper layers with the damp lower ones - this would immediately arouse the suspicion of the guards. Excess land was carried away with them on a cape. Having installed a mine, pebbles were laid on top - as they lay along the canvas before mining. As they left, they cleared their tracks. But all this was done at night, in absolute darkness, with silence observed: at the slightest sound, rockets soared into the sky and fire instantly opened ... Theoretically, in order to kill a railway rail, 200 grams of TNT or 400 grams of ammonite or ammonal are required, but in reality In fact, the explosion must be so strong as to snatch out a funnel in the flooring of the canvas, through which the wheelsets of the steam locomotive and wagon cannot jump. And for this you need at least 3-4 kilograms of TNT. Under the large echelon, 3-4 charges were placed in different places on the canvas. It was convenient to blow up the canvas at the turn, where the charge was placed at the junction of the rail - then the effect was greater.

Scouts-saboteurs for sabotage on highways developed an original tactic called "death field". The essence of this method is that two or three mines of pressure action are installed on the road, and the rear mines are triggered by the explosion of the front mine in the direction of travel. Thus, if the front car explodes, it will blow up 1-2 more cars following it. At the same time, along the movement of the column, along the ditches, German captured mines "spring-minen" S-34 were installed. This anti-personnel mine bounces up when it explodes.

During the explosion of cars, the surviving Germans rushed into the ditch and fell on jumping mines there.


Winter training of special forces

As already noted, reconnaissance groups in the rear often fell into enemy ambushes themselves and evaded pursuit. Avoiding pursuit, scouts usually mined anti-personnel mines your mark. They also broke away from their pursuers with the help of F-1 grenades. "Limonka" was fixed in a fork in the bush, next to the path. The pin of the grenade was almost pulled out, leaving the very tip holding the striker. The twine from the checks was pulled across the path, disguising it. Then, every 100 m, they left outstretched ropes, but without grenades. The calculation was like this. Having blown up, the pursuers will become more attentive, the string will stop them, but when their vigilance is dulled, when they are tired of empty searches, then another charge will work. If the Nazis took the group into the ring, surrounded, then the "ram" method of breaking through was used. First of all, they found the most extended line in the German chain, where there were gaps between the pursuers, so that firepower the group was stronger than that of the enemy in the place where the breakthrough was planned. The location of the RDG is a wedge, a ledge. In the moment of a breakthrough, everything is decided by speed, onslaught and surprise. The fighters rammed the chain with a wedge, firing from everything they had, and disappeared, leaving behind their pursuers shot at close range.

Humanity has been evolving for many thousands of years. During this time, there is a development of the art of war, with the help of which people kill each other on the battlefields. The biggest breakthrough in the field of military prowess came in the 20th century. Two world wars significantly influenced the perception and the very type of conflicts between states. Mankind has realized that the Third World War is simply not to survive. To date, all international disagreements are usually resolved through negotiations, but local conflicts still happen. In such confrontations, an important role is played by the military "invention" of the past century, which has a name - sabotage and reconnaissance groups. Such units are the most maneuverable and deadly. They have a specific organization and functions, which will be discussed in the article below.

History of sabotage units

To answer the question, what is DRG, you need to plunge into military history. Similar units began to be actively used in the XVIII century. Russian Empire. Of course, earlier examples were known, such as the centurion reconnaissance units in Rome or the special hoplite units in Greece, but they were all in their infancy. Purely sabotage functions began to perform the Cossacks. In his memoirs, Prince Prozorovsky wrote that the united detachments of the Cossacks broke through behind enemy lines without any problems and inflicted significant damage on its most fortified points. At the same time, such detachments avoided open battle. The principle of operation of the DRG has changed significantly in the 20th century.

DRG - abbreviation decoding

In the modern sense, the DRG or the sabotage and reconnaissance group is a highly mobile unit. As a rule, these groups are used for reconnaissance and sabotage deep behind enemy lines. In addition, the sabotage and reconnaissance group collects data on the fortified points of the enemy, objects that are of strategic value.

Any important information about the enemy that cannot be obtained by common reconnaissance methods is the goal of the sabotage and reconnaissance group. In order to understand in more detail the question of what DRG is, one should study the tasks assigned to these units.

Tasks of sabotage and reconnaissance groups

It was previously indicated that the DRG is a maneuverable group designed to conduct sabotage and reconnaissance activities behind enemy lines, from here the following main tasks can be distinguished:

  • complete disorganization of communications and transport, as well as other transportation systems;
  • disabling objects of strategic value;
  • demoralization of the enemy troops by spreading panic;
  • collection of data that is of strategic value (number of troops, their economic and combat performance, the location of the main military installations).

How is the preparation of sabotage and reconnaissance groups

Units of this type are almost always full-time in both the army and the navy.

In both branches of the armed forces, the principle of operation of the DRG and the tasks are similar. Personnel are intensively trained in the field of subversion, fire and
In addition, sabotage fighters intelligence groups subjected to strong psychological training. In addition, the personnel develop mountaineering skills, etc. Great emphasis is placed on developing abilities that allow them to "survive" in any conditions on enemy territory.

Sabotage and reconnaissance group: size and methods of work

The number of personnel is usually formed on the basis of specific tasks that are assigned to the DRG. The weapon of such units is stealth. They move across enemy territory in small numbers, which significantly increases their maneuverability and mobility. All of these features also contribute to reducing the chances of detecting DRGs. General purpose weapons are used by sabotage groups in extreme cases. Basically, the unit remains in the shadows to the last. The damage from attacks by sabotage and reconnaissance groups can be no less than from attacks by combat units of the army and navy. When such a group is exposed, often the command does not take any action to release or rescue it, due to the risk of recruiting such fighters by the enemy army. Thus, the activities of the DRG are quite risky.

Legal framework for the activities of sabotage and reconnaissance groups

Many people, when asked what a DRG is, identify these units with terrorists or other illegal paramilitaries. This approach is fundamentally wrong, since sabotage and reconnaissance groups operate within the strict framework of the international law of warfare. The activities of these units are allowed only in wartime. If these rules are violated, the activities of such groups will indeed be considered terrorism or a war crime. According to the rules of the DRG, it is allowed to cause damage to the following objects:

  • personnel of the enemy army;
  • strategic buildings;
  • military equipment;
  • Enemy DRG;
  • objects of the military-industrial complex.

This list is exhaustive. Causing damage to any other objects will be considered a war crime in wartime and an act of terrorism in peacetime.

Objects that cannot be attacked by sabotage and reconnaissance groups

There are a number of objects that have special protection. The most severe sanctions follow for harming them. It is prohibited to carry out reconnaissance and sabotage activities against:

  • peaceful, civilian population;
  • medical institutions, such as the Red Cross;
  • any other humanitarian facilities.

In addition, there are requirements that, when performing combat missions, members of the DRG wear uniforms with the distinctive signs of their state. Otherwise, their activities will be illegal. It is through the obligation to wear that the groups are distinguished from terrorist and other illegal formations.

Thus, we answered the question, what is DRG. The activity of such units evolves every year and acquires new aspects, which confirms the effectiveness of sabotage and reconnaissance groups.

The tactics of the actions of the illegal armed formations of Chechnya were developed with the participation of military advisers (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, etc.). It includes various methods and ways of fighting the troops, including the carrying out of sabotage and terrorist acts and agitation and propaganda activities.

The tactics of the illegal armed formations are based on the principles of guerrilla warfare and terrorism, the main of which are:

avoiding direct confrontations in open areas with superior forces;

renunciation of positional actions and, at the same time, stubborn holding of key objects (regions), especially when fighting in large settlements and mountains;

actions predominantly in small groups; skillful use of the terrain, setting up ambushes in tactically advantageous places;

careful selection of objects of influence, development of simple and realistic plans for one's actions, attack on the most vulnerable objects by superior forces;

the use of mobile methods of confrontation - a quick change of basing sites;

suddenness of action, the desire to keep the initiative in their hands;

widespread use of snipers;

rapid concentration of forces to solve important tasks and their dispersal in case of the threat of blocking or defeat;

strikes in one or simultaneously in several areas; use as a cover for the civilian population;

hostage-taking outside the zone of armed conflict;

the widespread use of mine-explosive devices to restrict the movement of troops and sabotage - "mine warfare";

stake on the exhaustion of the forces of law and order and troops;

comprehensive consideration and use of various factors to influence the public consciousness;

disinformation using the local population and the media.

The tactics of the actions of illegal armed formations are not constant and systematically change depending on the specific conditions of the situation, the tasks to be solved and the possibilities. Non-standard, specific methods of countering troops with extensive use of military cunning are widely used.

The tactics of the militants are based on good reconnaissance, maneuverability, the skillful use of various means of combat, especially mines and land mines, as well as mortars and anti-aircraft weapons, thorough knowledge of the terrain, surprise actions, rapid concentration of forces and means, timely exit from the battle and withdrawal of their detachments to hard-to-reach places, mutual support and fortitude in battle. Illegal armed formations may conduct combat operations by shelling (fire raids); limited offensive, attacks (raids); ambush device; committing sabotage and terrorist acts; conducting defense; by seizing important objects and hostages.

At the same time, mine-explosive barriers are widely used, agitation and propaganda work is being carried out. Large bandit formations can conduct operations to capture and hold important settlements, government, industrial and military facilities.

Forms and methods of tactical actions of formations of motorized rifle, internal troops and troops of the Federal border service RF

In the course of the CTO, the forms and methods of tactical actions of multi-departmental formations of law enforcement agencies received further development compared with the armed conflicts of the 50-90s. and, above all, the fighting in Vietnam, Afghanistan and the first Chechen military campaign. Characteristic here was that the destruction of illegal armed formations during the CTO was carried out by joint actions coordinated in terms of tasks, place and time. military units and units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, units and subunits of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB in cooperation with the FPS. In this case, various forms of tactical actions were used, among which were:

reconnaissance and search operations;

reconnaissance and strike actions;

raid and assault actions;

fight against raid units;

protection and defense of the location of military units (subdivisions) and settlements;

wiring of motor transport columns.

Reconnaissance and search operations could be continuous or selective. During a continuous search, the entire blockaded area was inspected, while during a selective search, only certain sections, directions, objects where militants could be located. According to the methods of action, the search was divided into: one-way, oncoming, in separate directions, search-inspection, search in the area, parallel search, search in converging directions, search in a spiral, search by objects, combined search.

One-way search was carried out by simultaneous movement of search groups in one direction within the lanes assigned to them. It was used in cases where reconnaissance and search groups (hereinafter - RPG) were able to reach the final line before dark.

The counter search was used when there was a lack of daylight hours, when the area of ​​operation was large, when a one-sided search turned out to be impossible or difficult due to the presence of natural obstacles.

Search in separate directions was used when there was a lack of forces and means, as well as in hard-to-reach areas of the terrain, where the movement of the enemy and the RGR was possible only in certain directions (in the mountains, in the forest).

Selective search was used on terrain that did not allow or made it difficult to carry out its complete inspection (mountainous, wooded, settlements), with a lack of forces and means. In these cases, only separate sections and objects were examined. The RPGR forced the militants to retreat to open areas of the terrain, where it was easier to detect, pursue and destroy them. At the time of the search, the area under inspection was isolated from the rest by blocking or setting up barriers.

Search by objects was used mainly in settlements to inspect individual buildings and farms.

A spiral search was carried out in cases where the area of ​​operations of the RPG was in the shape of a circle, and the alleged militant forces in it were insignificant.

A parallel search was carried out by the RPG in adjacent areas, for which mutual identification signals were installed.

The subdivisions of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs used their own search methods.

The search in the blockaded area was used when there were sufficient forces and means to conduct a continuous cordon of the area where the bandit groups were located, which made it possible to exclude the possibility of their exit from the area. This method was the main and most effective.

The search in the non-blockaded area was carried out when there were not enough forces and means for complete blocking.

The border search had its own characteristics. The basis of its organization was the timely strengthening of the border service and the cover (blocking) of the border search area; concentration of the main efforts on the directions of the probable movement of violators of the state border (DRG, BF); active and continuous search operations of all forces and means involved in the search; effective implementation of operational security measures. The combat order of military forces and assets in the border search included: a cover group, a blocking group, a search group, a helicopter unit, an encirclement group and a fire group.

Reconnaissance and strike actions were used in cases where, as a result of the search, it was not possible to accurately identify the location of the illegal armed formations. They were carried out with the aim of capturing and destroying messengers, intelligence officers and small groups of militants, as well as supply bases (groups), ammunition depots and command posts (headquarters); capture of prisoners and samples of weapons; completion of the destruction of objects after air strikes and artillery fire; reconnaissance of advance routes and areas of concentration of large bandit formations using special forces (reconnaissance and strike groups - RUGR).

The most effective forms of such actions were: ambush; double ambush; tempting ambush; waiting ambush; ambush-octopus; ambush-raid; raid-ambush; ambush-bait; ambush attack; ambush; hit-raid; double raid.

An ambush is a form of action by a reconnaissance and strike group or part of it, when it is located in the path of movement of militants, and then suddenly attacks them in order to destroy them, capture prisoners, documents, weapons and military equipment, disorganize (disrupt) movement and weaken their combat potential. It settles, first of all, on roads, in closed areas, in gorges, gorges, and on passes.

A double ambush was carried out in the case when the advancing column of militants significantly outnumbered the RUG forces, and the conditions of the terrain (time) did not allow an attack to be carried out in order to inflict maximum damage on the enemy, as a result of which he could not counterattack. In order to save the RUGR for setting up an ambush in this way, the group was divided into two parts, each of which organized an independent ambush along the route of the militant column at a distance of several tens to hundreds of meters from each other. The attack was carried out first by the first ambush, and then by the second. Ambush fire was opened from a distance of several hundred meters and was carried out in such a way that the RUGR could escape from a retaliatory strike (counterattack). The purpose of the ambush was not so much to defeat the militants as to disrupt their planned action.

The decoy ambush consisted of two ambushes. The first was organized along the path of movement of militants, significantly superior in strength to the RUG, and the second was built in a place convenient for defeating the enemy. As the militants approached the planned line, the personnel of the first ambush opened fire on them and forced them to turn around in battle formation, attack the reconnaissance and strike group No. -shock group. At the same time, minefields were installed on the paths of the militants.

The pending ambush included two or three ambushes on possible militant routes. It was arranged when there was intelligence information about the direction of movement of their column (group), but it was not known in advance which way the enemy could advance. Therefore, independent ambushes were made on two or three possible routes.

According to calculations, an ambush consisting of 1-2 ATGM systems, 1-3 grenade launchers, 1-2 machine gunners, 1-3 snipers, 1 infantry fighting vehicle, 1 tank is capable of defeating a bandit group of up to 50-60 people, destroying 2-3 armored objects, 5-7 cars.

The ambush-octopus was arranged around the settlement (base) in which the militants were located. Since the forces of one RUGR are clearly not enough to block and check (inspect) it, it was divided into two to four parts, each of which organized an independent ambush on possible routes of movement of militants. After completing the task of one of the ambushes, the rest, depending on the situation, could either remain on the expected paths of the enemy’s movement, or all went to the assembly point.

The ambush-raid was used in the case when it was impossible to raid the fortified camp of militants, which did not exceed the number of the RUGr, in any other way. To this end, an ambush was arranged on the path of the probable advance of the enemy not far from his camp. With the approach of militants at a certain distance, fire was opened on them, and mine-explosive barriers were also blown up in order to force them to hide behind the fortifications of the camp. The retreating men were pursued by the RUGR fighters, who literally burst into his lair on the shoulders of the enemy. There were several options for conducting an ambush in this way.

The ambush raid was carried out in order to lure the manpower of illegal armed formations to a pre-prepared place for an ambush with its subsequent destruction. To do this, part of the RUGR carried out a raid either on a fortified camp or on a convoy of militants with the task of dragging them along. The raid itself in this case was fire from all types of weapons. maximum range and then a hasty retreat. The rebels, seeing easy prey, rushed after the scouts, went to the ambush site of the main group, which destroyed them with point-blank fire.

A decoy ambush was expressed in the fact that a group of servicemen openly carried out some work or actions (for example, repairing a car) in order to attract the attention of the enemy and set up an ambush on the probable path of the bandits to this object.

The ambush attack consisted in the implementation of a demonstrative attack by most of the RUGR forces at the place of the temporary location of the militants (farm, grove, etc.), and at the same time an ambush was created by a smaller part of it on the possible retreat path of the bandit group from the location area.

The ambush was organized in order to destroy a small group of militants on the ground, clearly inconvenient for an ambush. To do this, an ambush was arranged on the way of their movement, with the approach to which the first (largest part of the RUG) opened fire on them and attacked the enemy, forcing him to retreat to the place of the second ambush.

Mobile ambushes were actively used. The essence of the actions during their organization was the location of only observation groups in convenient places. Attacking (assault) groups were located in the depths of the area; on a signal from one of the observation groups about the approach of militants, the attack group advanced with intense dagger fire (including fire support groups), inflicted losses, destroyed or captured terrorists. In this case, the battle order of the motorized rifle subunit allocated for organizing the ambush consisted of groups: attacking (assault), observation, support, fire and reserve.

A strike-raid consisted of inflicting an initial strike by aviation (attack aircraft, combat helicopters), artillery or missiles on a camp (column, base) of militants, followed by their attack by RUGR forces.

A double raid was carried out on a heavily fortified base of militants, initially by the first part of the RUGR in order to divert their attention and concentrate efforts in this direction, followed by an attack from another direction by the second part of the group.

Raid-assault operations have found a fairly wide application in the course of counter-warfare. Their essence was to block groups and detachments of illegal armed formations by means of a quick and covert maneuver and to defeat them by delivering combined strikes from the front, flanks and rear, from the ground and air. For the complete destruction of the retreating groups of militants, fire strikes were inflicted, fire bags and ambushes were used.

Among the tactics used by the raid units in the destruction of bandit groups were:

attack (assault);

frontal impact;

one-sided or two-sided coverage;

destruction in a fire bag;

one-way or two-way bypass;

combination various kinds maneuver.

The attack (assault) was carried out by motorized rifle and tank units in cooperation with other attached (supporting) units with the decisive goal of completely destroying the enemy terrorist group.

An attacking (assault) detachment was created in the unit, including one or two groups. Each of them included: a motorized rifle platoon with an attached tank platoon or a motorized rifle platoon reinforced with one or two tanks, flamethrowers and sappers. In addition, a fire support group was created from attached artillery and mortar units, as well as a reserve (up to a motorized rifle platoon).

On the flanks there should be groups of ambushes, which have the task of preventing individual terrorists from breaking out of the encirclement.

If the attack was carried out by the forces of airmobile formations, then the following tactics were used: air assault attack, air attack, helicopter pincer attack, double air assault attack.

The following methods of destroying encircled militants are possible: "noose", "piston", "double piston", "attack in converging directions", "sledgehammer". The "noose" involves the gradual compression of the encirclement ring by simultaneously moving towards the center of all units carrying out the encirclement.

During the encirclement of the illegal armed formations, two rings were created: the inner one, in order to prevent the breakthrough or infiltration of the encircled militants, and the outer one, in order to prevent their accomplices and accomplices from helping them. On the encircled and blocked territory (or a large object), the movement of all persons who were not part of the unit conducting the encirclement or blocking was prohibited until the final liquidation of the terrorist group. First of all, the communication system was disrupted, all directions and objects of the transport network, communication nodes that could be used by terrorists were blocked.

The pursuit was carried out with the task of destroying or capturing militants who sought to evade attacks (combat contact) of motorized rifle units that surrounded or blocked a given area (object). It was carried out by attacking (assault), patrol groups, reinforced service dogs, ambush groups and reserves. The persecution of the militants was carried out with full effort. When pursued, it was understood that the terrorist group could leave part of the forces, and the rest could be left in cover to create a fire bag. To counteract this, the protection of the flanks and rear was necessarily provided.

The protection and defense of the location of military units, subdivisions, bases, warehouses, settlements, administrative buildings, etc. was organized in order to prevent the penetration, attacks and terrorist acts of illegal armed formations. The tasks were carried out by specially designated units from motorized rifle units, units and subunits of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs OMON, OOBR, outposts, combat guards, ambushes, checkpoints, patrols, secrets, observation posts, as well as personnel of guards and internal outfit.

Thus, the fight against irregular, insurgent, paramilitary, rebellious formations that use sabotage and terrorist methods, do not comply with any international norms of military law, blurred borders between the front and rear in the combat zone, and the focal nature of hostilities necessitated the search for non-stereotypical methods of training and conducting the operation.

The essence of the new tactics during the campaign is to use the advantage of the federal troops in heavy weapons, which the bandits almost did not have - rocket and artillery weapons, aviation. It was these types of weapons that played a decisive role in the defeat of bandit formations in the second Chechen campaign.

The experience of the two Chechen campaigns requires a revision of approaches to the organization of combat and operational training, the introduction of clarifications into the existing charters, changes in the combat training system, methods of conducting tactical exercises, etc. It is necessary to pay attention to the study of partisan forms and methods of conducting combat operations as well as "enemy".